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Abstract
This paper is the first part of a wide-ranging study of the role of intellectual property in 
the software industry.  The project focuses on the software industry because of the importance of 
that industry to the modern economy, because of the importance of innovation to that industry, 
and because of the well-known difficulties of accommodating traditional intellectual-property 
regimes (patent, copyright, and trade secret) to innovation in the industry.
This paper focuses on innovation in the hundreds of small venture-backed firms that form 
the bulk of the population of the industry.  After a brief description of the history of the industry 
in Part II, Part III discusses the evidence on which the paper relies: a set of about 50 interviews of 
industry executives – diversified geographically, by size of company, and by role in the industry 
(software developers, venture capitalists, lenders, etc.).  Relying on those interviews, the paper 
provides a detailed explication of the role that intellectual property plays in the industry.
Parts IV through VI of the paper organize the information from the interviews and situate 
it in the extensive literatures on venture capital investing, the economics of innovation, and 
patents.  The first substantive topic of the paper (Part IV) is the features of startup firms that 
attract investment by venture capitalists – generally something about the startup that suggests a 
“sustainable differentiation” of the firm from its competitors.  The differentiation could come 
from any number of advantages the firm has – a first-mover advantage, special skill of its 
employees, a unique approach to solving a difficult problem, or, in some cases, intellectual-
property protection.
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The second substantive part of the paper (Part V) discusses the role of copyright.  The 
major point of this part is that copyright protection is of little value to startup firms.  Copyright 
protection is designed to protect expression, and not functionality.  Thus, it provides little of the 
protection for which venture investors are looking.  The basic problem is that it does not offend 
copyright law if a competitor observes a software product and designs a new product that 
includes precisely the same functionality, so long as the competitor uses none of the “expression” 
from the first product.  Because the competitor’s customers are for the most part interested in the 
functionality, not the expression, this is not an important constraint.  On the other hand, copyright 
protection does provide important protections in other areas, most obviously in protecting the 
later-stage firm’s products from piracy.  Generally, this part of the paper tells a story of 
unsuccessful efforts to stretch the copyright regime to do something it never was intended to do.
The final substantive part of the paper (Part VI) discusses the role of patents.  Because 
patents do protect functionality, they have at least the theoretical potential to provide the 
sustainable differentiation for which investors are looking.  The problem, however, is that in 
many sectors of the software industry innovation is not of a character that a typical patent can 
protect a firm from competitors: often competitors would be able to design a competing product 
that works around a firm’s patent.  Thus, despite significant increases in patenting in the industry, 
about 80% of venture-backed software firms do not obtain patents during the early years of their 
existence.  The question, then, is what benefits patents do provide to those firms.  This part 
explores several benefits, including the classic benefit of excluding competitors.  In this industry 
at least, that benefit accrues primarily to small firms, protecting them from the competitive 
depredations of incumbents.  Incumbents, by contrast, rarely use patents to exclude smaller firms 
from the industry.  The part also discusses a series of less conventional benefits small firms gain 
from software patents: as barter in cross-licensing arrangements, in signaling their technical 
competence to third parties, in converting tacit knowledge into a verifiable and transferable form, 
and in making the firm attractive to potential acquirers.
The paper closes by discussing the implications of the patent analysis for recent debates 
about the value of patents in the software industry.  The paper starts with a discussion of 
theoretical literature suggesting that free availability of patented technology is important because 
of the software industry’s reliance on cumulative patterns of innovation.  It then presents 
evidence about existing practices in the industry suggests that technology in fact is readily 
available, rebutting the prominent claims of a patent “thicket” that is supposedly stifling 
innovation in the industry.  On the contrary, I argue, to the extent patents have an important effect 
in the industry, it is an effect that inures primarily to the benefit of the smaller firms trying to find 
a foothold from which they can compete.
THE MYTH OF THE SOFTWARE PATENT THICKET:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INNOVATION IN SOFTWARE FIRMS
I.  Introduction
For a scholar interested in understanding how intellectual property (IP) works in 
practice, the software industry is a natural topic for examination.  Most obviously, it is 
important because the software industry is one of the leading areas of innovation in our 
economy,1 and because the United States software industry is one of the few information 
technology (IT) sectors that consistently has been able to run a large trading surplus with 
other countries.2  In addition, as a legal matter, software is protected not only by state 
trade-secret rules, but also by federal copyright and patent laws.  Neither of the federal IP 
systems is regarded as being well suited to the industry.3  The interplay among those 
methods of protection makes the role of law in the industry almost uniquely interesting.4
At the same time, the formal role of IP in the industry is in flux.  Most 
prominently, recent doctrinal changes in patent law have made patents on pure software 
inventions directly available for the first time.5  Those changes have led to a proliferation 
in software patents in recent years.  Although it is difficult to get precise numbers,6 it is 
1
 Indeed, it is fair to say that innovation in the software and related industries has driven 
much of the innovation in other industries during recent decades.  MOWERY & NELSON 1999.
2 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002, p. 53 (noting trade surpluses in the software 
industry of more than $2.5 billion a year during the late 1990’s).
3
 For a comprehensive explication of the problem, see Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & 
Reichman (1994).  For more recent commentary, see Gruner (2000):992-98 (general doctrinal 
analysis); Haynes (1999) (trenchant argument that software protection slows innovation that 
would proceed at the proper pace if patent law were left unimpeded).
4
 For a coherent discussion of that interplay as a doctrinal matter, see Dennis S. Karjala, 
The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41 (1998).
5
 For general discussion of the rise of the software patent, see Burk & Lemley 
(2002):1160-73; Cantzler (2000).
6
 The problem is that the system by which the Patent and Trademark Office classifies 
patents does not have a separate class (or classes) into which software-related inventions fall.  
Thus, all data about the number of software patents to date have been produced by rough 
estimates of various kinds.  See Allison & Lemley (2000): 2115 & n.51.  In a forthcoming paper 
with John Allison, I respond to that problem by looking from the perspective of the patentee; we 
collect and analyze a dataset of patents granted to the 500 largest firms in the software industry.
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clear that the Patent and Trademark Office is granting more than 10,000 software patents 
each year.7
As the issuance of software patents increases, scholars have expressed 
considerable doubt that patents are useful for the software industry at all.  It was a 
prominent topic in recent FTC hearings on the balance of competition and patent law.8
The broadest form of the criticism – associated with Carl Shapiro and Larry Lessig –
argues that the rapid proliferation of software patents has created a “patent thicket” that 
deters innovation, particularly by small firms that are not well placed to compete against 
the portfolios of their larger and better-heeled competitors.9  John Barton has made the 
criticism even more general: arguing that the growth of IP lawyers at a faster pace than 
R&D spending shows a serious problem in the design of our patent system.10  That 
concern has been buttressed by a widely discussed (though not published) empirical study 
by James Bessen and Eric Maskin suggesting that R&D spending has been declining in 
the software industry at the same time that patent issuance has been rising.11  A more 
guarded concern expressed by Mark Lemley in papers with Julie Cohen and Dan Burk 
suggests that, at a minimum, software patents should be construed to have a narrow 
scope.12  The issue also is under debate in Europe, where the European Union is in the 
7
 Allison & Lemley (2000) finds 18,000 software patents during a two-year period from 
1996-1998.  Their number is extrapolated from a sample of all patents issued during a two-year 
period, using a methodology that treats a patent as a software patent only if it is “completely 
embodied” in software.  Allison & Lemley (2000):2110, 2115.  Greg Aharonian’s somewhat 
broader measure (which appears to include any patent that includes an element of software) 
estimates 13,000, 17,500, and 22,500 in 1997, 1998, and 1999 respectively.
8 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
9 See LESSIG (2001):205-15; Shapiro (2001); FTC REPORT:52-53.
10
 Barton (2000).  Doubts about whether the patent system as a whole causes an increase 
in innovation are not new.  See Plant (1934):33-37.  Moreover, all of these studies assume that 
increases in innovation are uniformly good: they do not consider the possibility that the patent 
system might cause excessive innovation.  E.g., Merges & Nelson (1990):878 (recognizing the 
problem, but explicitly assuming that more innovation is better).  The classic counterexample is 
Barzel (1968) (formal analysis of the possibility that patents will cause innovation that is greater 
or earlier than optimal).
11 See Bessen & Maskin (2002).  Bessen advances that work in a recent working paper.  
Bessen (2003).  Whatever the theoretical implications of Bessen’s claims might be if they were 
true, I discuss at the end of this paper evidence indicating that the factual basis for them – that 
R&D spending is unusually low in the software industry – is at least overstated.  
12 See Burk & Lemley (2003):82-90; Cohen & Lemley (2001).  Lemley’s work, however, 
does not suggest a uniform antipathy to software patents.  Lemley (1997) hails the primacy of 
patent protection for software as supporting a beneficial trend toward reusing specific software 
components instead of having each developer rewrite similar pieces of code from scratch.  Also, 
Burk & Lemley acknowledge that TRIPS would bar any special statutory treatment for software.  
Burk & Lemley (2003):110-11.  Rather, they argue, courts should use a variety of policy levers to 
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midst of a process that may – or may not – result in EU-wide availability of patents for 
software.13
In the face of the controversy about software patents, it is astonishing how little 
work has been done directed specifically at the software industry.  There has been some 
serious doctrinal analytical work – most notably the seminal Manifesto by Pam 
Samuelson and her co-authors and the work of Mark Lemley and his co-authors 
discussed above.14  There has not been, however, any substantial published empirical 
work about the role of patents in the industry.15  Aside from two studies examining the 
European industry,16 the most prominent paper that provides any empirical evidence 
about the software industry itself is the Bessen & Maskin paper mentioned above.17  That 
paper, however, ends its inquiry in 1995, only one year after the en banc decision of the 
Federal Circuit in In re Alappat that cleared the way for software patents.18
treat software patents appropriately in light of the patterns of innovation in the industry.  See Burk 
& Lemley (2003):210-20.
13 See EC Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions (Feb. 20, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comp/com02-92en.pdf (last visited Apr. 
18, 2003).
14
 Samuelson, Davis, Kapor & Reichman (1994); see also Samuelson (1990).  The 
Manifesto provides a thorough description of the software industry as it had developed through 
the early 1990’s, together with a thoughtful proposal for a sui generis system of IP protection that 
would combine particular features of the copyright and patent systems.
15
 That is clearest by the lack of certainty about the most basic fact – how many software 
patents there are, see supra note 7 – despite the frequent academic complaints that there are far 
too many.  While this paper was being prepared, I located a draft of Thakur (2003).  That paper 
does analyze a dataset of patents held by software firms, but it is limited to the very largest firms 
in the industry and thus does not contribute much to an understanding of the role of patenting in 
the industry as a whole.
16 See Micro-and Macroeconomic Implications of the Patentability of Software (2001); 
Tang, Adams & Paré (2001).  Although those studies are interesting – I draw parallels to them 
below – they have limited value in assessing the role of IP in the United States because the 
European software industry is so much smaller than the American one, see Campbell-Kelly 
(2003):23, and because its structure raises such different policy concerns, see Kahin (2002):13-
18.
17
 To get a sense for the problem, the large empirical study of patenting by Allison & 
Lemley that is the basis for Allison & Lemley (2000) includes only 76 software patents.  Allison 
& Lemley (2000):76.  Allison & Tiller also are working on a not-yet published study on business-
method patents, which includes a substantial body of certain classes of software patents.  Allison 
& Tiller (2003).  Finally, Bessen also is working on a number of as-yet unpublished papers (some 
of which I discuss below).
18
 33 F.3d 1526 (1994).
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Moreover, like all of the studies to date, their papers focus on software patents, 
not the software industry.  Because there is considerable ambiguity about exactly what a 
software patent is – they do not fall into any specific PTO class – and because many 
patents in the classes that indisputably do constitute software patents are held outside the 
industry, that work says little or nothing about the software industry itself.  As I 
suggested above, software is unusual among patentable goods in its interaction with all 
sectors of the economy.  Thus, there are some software features in a wide variety of 
otherwise unrelated products.
That should not, however, obscure the fact that there is a large, highly populated, 
highly innovative, and successful software industry – and that any positive and adverse 
effects of doctrinal rules related to software are likely to be concentrated in that industry.  
To the extent that existing papers do consider some of the firms in that industry, they tend 
to focus on large publicly traded firms.  That emphasis causes the papers to miss the 
implications of various features of the software industry that are crucial to this inquiry: 
the immense number of firms in the industry (indicating low barriers to entry) and the 
variation among the sectors in the industry.
This study meets those needs with a contextual study of the role that patent and 
copyright law protections play in fostering innovation in the software industry.  
Specifically, this study attempts to understand as precisely as possible the role that 
intellectual property plays in generating investments in startup firms in the software 
industry.  From a broader perspective, it is a case study attempting to provide some 
concrete analysis of the suggestion of Mazzoleni and Nelson that in some industries we 
can find value for patents entirely in their ability to induce commercialization of 
inventions.19  The gist of that theory is that patents induce commercialization by helping 
inventors to obtain the financing that they need to commercialize their product.20 As 
Mazzoleni and Nelson point out, that theory suggests that the patent process is most 
useful in cases in which innovation would occur in “a small firm that must marshal 
outside funds,”21 exactly the situation that we see in the software industry.
This paper rests on a series of more than fifty interviews with industry executives.  
I included those who create the software (executives at startup companies) those who 
finance its creation (venture capitalists, angel investors, and banks), and those who 
represent them in those endeavors (lawyers in firms and also at the various companies).  
The wide-ranging interviews were designed to gain as much contextual information as 
possible about the motivations for patenting (or not patenting) in the industry.  I rely on 
interviews because the goal of this study is not to understand the quantitative question –
19 See Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1040-42 (crediting Eisenberg (1997) as the source of 
the theory).
20 See Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1040-42; Eisenberg (1997).
21
 Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1041.
Software IP July 13, 2004 Draft5
5
do software startups obtain patents?22 – but rather to examine the more fundamental 
question discussed above: exactly how (if at all) patents contribute to innovation.  
Because that question turns on subjective motivations that are not readily quantifiable, in-
depth interviews are the best method of obtaining information.23
 The body of the paper has five parts.  Part II provides a brief overview of some 
key features of the software industry: the origins of the industry, the early role of 
intellectual property in the industry, and the importance of small firms in industry 
innovation. Part III discusses the methodology for the interviews.  Parts IV through VI 
then present the results of the interviews.  First, Part IV discusses the perspectives of 
those who provide funds for early-stage companies: venture capitalists, bank lenders, and 
angel investors.  The principal point of that part is that the investors are primarily 
concerned with sustainable differentiation: does the company have something that 
differentiates its product from competing products in a way that can be sustained over 
time.  Parts V and VI build on that point to assess the extent to which copyrights and
patent can assuage that concern.
Part V discusses the role of copyright.  The Part proceeds in three steps.  First, I 
explain why copyright law plays no substantial role in providing the sustainable 
differentiation that investors seek in deciding whether to invest in early-stage software 
firms.  Second, I discuss the special case of those companies that lend to startups.  Those 
lenders traditionally have taken care to obtain a perfected interest in copyrights of their 
borrowers.  As I explain, that practice does not indicate that the copyrights are valuable 
for the startups.  On the contrary, it indicates that in many ways the extension of 
copyright law to cover unregistered software is an unwanted nuisance.  Third, I attempt to 
place the role of copyright law in a broader context of the software industry as a whole.  
Despite its disutility for attracting startup funding, copyright protection plays several key 
roles in the structure of the industry.  Among other things, it is particularly important in 
consumer and international markets where blatant copying of object code – piracy – is a 
serious problem.  Similarly, it also is important in protecting companies against 
competition by former employees or business contacts who might leave a company with 
substantial amounts of copyright code and attempt to reuse it in a later venture.
22 A companion paper with Tom Sager analyzes quantitative evidence about possible 
correlations between the success of software startups in obtaining funding and the size of their 
patent portfolios.  That study (which is discussed in this paper where relevant) indicates that only
about 20% of the software startups that received venture funding in the late 1990’s have received 
a patent.  Indeed, even among software startups that received venture funding in the mid 1990’s 
(many of whom are now public companies), only about 30% have received patents through the 
present date.
23
 The only similar study – the examination of the semi-conductor industry in Hall & 
Ziedonis (2001) – relies on a similar series of interviews in that context.  See also Walsh, Arora & 
Cohen (2002) (relying on interviews in the biotechnology industry to reject the “anti-commons” 
thesis articulated in Heller & Eisenberg (1998)).
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Part VI, about the role of patents, is the first effort in the literature to explain at a 
micro-level exactly how and why small firms might – or might not – benefit from 
obtaining patents.  The basic thesis of this part is that patents have an important effect on 
the structure of the industry by making it easier for smaller startup firms to obtain 
financing and then to protect themselves from incumbent competitors long enough to 
gain significant market traction.  More directly, I argue that patents are much more likely 
to aid the creation and survival of small firms than they are to foster the continued 
dominance of existing firms.  The analysis proceeds in two steps.  First, relying largely 
on the interviews, I explain the specific benefits that patents can provide to the firms that 
obtain them.  At the core of those explanations is the basic potential for patents to secure 
for the smallest of firms the ability to practice its innovation in some narrow area 
protected by the patent.  That potential might differ greatly from sector to sector and 
patent to patent, but it does seem to play an important structural role in the industry.
Nonstructural explanations also appear.  First, patents are said to be useful as 
“barter” in cross-licensing agreements that the firm would enter into if it reached a 
sufficiently mature stage to be a significant player in the industry.  Second, patents are 
said to provide a “signal” of engineering discipline and market understanding: firms that 
get patents tend to be more careful in their engineering work and to understand what is 
special about their products better than competitors that do not have patents.  Third, 
patents are said to be important for “marketing”: convincing the investors in public 
markets that the company’s technology is valuable.  The idea here is that sophisticated 
investors at the early stage can evaluate the “true” value of the technology based on a 
careful analysis of such factors as the company’s product, customer’s needs for that 
product, and the personnel that the company employs to execute its business plan.  Later-
stage investors, by contrast, are said to be less willing to undertake such careful 
evaluations and rely (less thoughtfully) on the mere existence of patents in the company’s 
portfolio.
Part VI then considers the policy implications of this study.  Although there is 
much work that remains to be done,24 the results of this initial study are relevant to the 
concerns in the existing literature about the role of patents.  That literature has recognized 
the importance of industry differences along two separate dimensions: innovation 
proceeds differently in some industries than it does in others; and patents work differently 
in some industries than they do in others.  With respect to the software industry in 
particular, several scholars25 have suggested that patents do not contribute to innovation 
in the industry at all.  Although my evidence is inherently anecdotal – and thus not 
definitive – it does leave me strongly inclined to reject that argument.  I make two main 
points.  First, the critics generally have failed to appreciate the variety of ways in which 
24
 In particular, a comprehensive understanding of software patents in the industry 
requires work about the role that software patents play in large firms.  As mentioned above, I am 
in the midst of work with John Allison on a study of that topic.
25
 Bartow (2000) (focusing on software); see Kash & Kingston (2001) (arguing that 
patents do not work in complex industries because they are used as bargaining chips).
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software patents can contribute to innovation.  There are several contributions software 
patents make, some of which have the potential to provide a substantial net benefit for the 
industry.  Second, most of the criticisms rest on the implicit or explicit assumption that 
the spread of patents through the industry will hinder innovation because the patented 
technology in fact is not available to developers at smaller and less well-established 
firms.  Although the evidence discussed here cannot justify a categorical rejection of 
those claims, it does make it difficult to take those concerns seriously.  Taken together, 
the volume of multiple-round financing of patentless startup firms, as well as the cross
licensing at low transaction costs that pervades the industry, suggest that the existing 
body of patents are not stifling innovation in startup firms in any substantial way.
Indeed, it strongly suggests that patents are central to the creation of the highly 
fractionated and innovative industry that has developed in the last decade.
II.  The Software Industry
To situate the argument I present about the relation between IP and the structure 
of the software industry, it is important to start with some basic introductory facts about 
the software industry.  The software industry generally is regarded as originating in the 
mid-1960’s.26  The concept of the software product – designed by one firm and sold to a 
second firm for use on that firm’s computer – first originated because of the increasing 
complexity of software27 and the shortage of the labor needed for each firm to make its 
own software.28  The single most crucial event was the decision of IBM in late 1968 to 
“unbundle” its software from its hardware.29  From that point, sales of software products 
grew rapidly throughout the 1970’s.  By the 1980’s, the United States had a large and 
well-developed corporate software products industry, with more than 1800 firms.30
The industry was not, however, fated to retain the more or less unitary status that 
it had when it first evolved out of the IBM-dominated days of the 1960’s.  On the 
contrary, the last quarter-century has seen the succession of a series of events that have 
repeatedly remade the terrain of the industry.  The first of these was the introduction of 
the personal computer in the mid-1970’s, which led to a largely separate set of companies
26
 The discussion of the early period draws heavily on CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):89-119.
27
 Observers at the time – including IBM management – were profoundly shocked when 
it took 5,000 man-years for IBM to develop its OS/360 program.  CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):95.
28
 The shortage was driven in part by the rapid deployment of general-purpose computers; 
the number in the U.S. grew from 4,400 in 1960 to 48,500 in 1970.  CAMPBELL-KELLY
(2003):90; RUTTAN (2001):338.
29
 Although IBM has more complicated explanations for the decision to unbundle, 
external observers attribute the decision to pressures from antitrust litigation.  See CAMPBELL-
KELLY (2003): 109-10.
30 See CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):121-73.
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producing software for personal computers.31  The popularization of the graphical user 
interface in the early 1990’s brought with it an increasingly large role for Microsoft, but 
to this day dozens of competitors continue to provide significant products for those 
machines.32  Yet another sector of the industry that arose by that time is the massive 
sector producing games and other entertainment software.33  Finally, the rise of the 
Internet has brought first a tremendous influx of capital into the industry and then a 
subsequent crash and weeding out when companies were not able to produce results 
sufficient to justify the elevated equity valuations of 2000 and 2001.
The most startling thing about the industry as it has matured is the astonishing 
lack of concentration in the industry – a facet that has considerable implications for the 
competitive structure of the industry and its openness to innovation.34  Although press 
reports (and much of the academic writing as well) are preoccupied with concerns about 
the dominance of Microsoft, the industry is populated with an unusually large number of 
significant commercial players.  Census Bureau statistics report more than 40,000 firms 
in the industry as of 2000.35 More than 500 firms in the industry had a million or more 
dollars in sales in 2002, even after the cutbacks and contractions in the industry at the 
turn of the millennium.36  In that same year, 209 new firms received their first round of 
venture capital financing, a total of $872 million (an average of more than $4 million for 
each firm) during a markedly down year for the industry.37  Moreover, despite the 
existence of some prominent firms, the number of large firms is very small – there are 
only three software firms in the current Fortune 500.  Indeed, the top ten firms in terms of 
revenue had less than thirty percent of the revenues of the industry as a whole – an 
astonishingly small figure when we consider the major industries in which there are not 
ten players in the entire country.
31 See CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):201-28; RUTTAN (2001):338-39; Graham & Mowery 
(2002):3-4 
32 See CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):231-66.
33 See CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):269-301.
34
 This is nothing new.  See, e.g. , CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):167 (noting that the software 
industry even by the early 1980’s was much less concentrated than the parallel hardware industry 
out of which it had grown).
35
 I am aggregating data from NAICS 5112 (Software Publishers) and 541511 (Custom 
Computer Programming Services.  The data are available at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E541511.HTM and 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/industry/E5112.HTM (both last visited on Oct. 7, 2003).
36
 The smallest firm in the 2002 Software 500 was PaperClip Software, Inc., with sales of 
$1.2 million.
37
 Overall during 2002, 652 software companies received a total of $4.3 billion (that is, 
443 firms received second or subsequent rounds during 2002).  Since 1995, 2907 new firms have 
received venture-capital financing.  2003 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 
YEARBOOK 40.
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The lack of concentration of the industry is underscored by the immense variety 
of products, which produces such a large number of market niches that no single 
company (even Microsoft or IBM) could maintain market power in all of them.38  The 
most recent promulgation of the Software 500,39 for example, describes the major sectors 
with the following lengthy list (with characteristic firms in parentheses): operating 
systems (Microsoft), middleware (IBM), database (Oracle), storage management 
(Unisys), financial applications (Intuit), computer-aided design (Autodesk), e-business 
applications (SAP and Software AG), application development tools (Sun and 
Compuware), infrastructure (Computer Associates), customer-relationship management 
(Siebel Systems), enterprise-resource planning (PeopleSoft), security (Symantec, 
Verisign), supply chain (Aspect Technology), business intelligence (Cognos), 
content/document management (Vignette), vertical industry applications (Per-Se 
Technologies), wireless (Qualcomm), and IT services (Hewlett-Packard).
The industry also has recorded an astonishing level of employment growth over 
the last decade, from 854,000 jobs in 1992 to more than 2.1 million jobs in 2000 (a 12 
percent annual growth rate).40 During that period, the wages earned by employees grew 
at an average annual rate of 7.8 percent, for a 2000 average wage of $80,900, the highest 
in any of the information technology-producing industries.41
For present purposes, what is most important about the track of development is 
the ebb and flow of IP protection for software for much of the industry’s history.  
Although the form of the protection has changed from time to time, it is fair to say that 
“[t]he United States has traditionally embraced strong protection for computer 
software.”42 In the early days, it was generally believed that it was “trivially easy to 
replicate” the software program of a competitor.43  When initial efforts by major industry 
players to obtain patents on their products were unsuccessful,44 firms (and Congress) 
turned to copyright as an alternative.45 The Copyright Office formally decided to permit 
38 See CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):231-66 (chapter headed “Not Only Microsoft” 
discussing various successful strategies for competing with Microsoft).
39
 The unusual fractionation of the industry is underscored by the very existence of a 
Software 500 – what other single industry has such a thing?
40 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002, p. 43.
41 Id.
42
 Merges (1996a):277.
43 CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):107.
44 See CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):107; Menell (2002):15-16 (discussing Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
45
 Congress codified a definition of computer program as “a set of statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”  
17 U.S.C. § 101.  See Menell (2002):16-20 (discussing that history).
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registration of programs in the mid-1960’s.46 Initially, this was a promising arrangement, 
based on an analogy of literary expression to the lines of code of which a software 
program is composed.47 Thus, until the late 1980’s copyright provided relatively strong 
protection for software.48
However, as the courts began to face more of these cases, the courts eventually 
narrowed copyright protection so that it ceased to provide robust protection.49  The key 
problem that the courts increasing faced was that “there is nothing in the statute nor in the 
legislative history to indicate that Congress intended for copyright to protect the results 
(that is, behavior) brought about by the execution of program instructions.”50 Thus, in 
Computer Associates v. Altai in 1992, the Second Circuit adopted a “hard-look” 
framework that made it difficult to obtain copyright protection for the broader structural 
features of entire programs.  The court limited protection to specific pieces of the 
program limited to “expression.”51 Two years later, the Ninth Circuit refused to protect 
Apple’s graphical user interface from appropriation by Microsoft.52 The façade of 
pervasive copyright protection came crashing to a definitive ruin with the celebrated 
decision of the First Circuit three years later in Lotus Development Corp v. Borland Int’l, 
Inc.53
Yet, long before those decisions limited the overarching importance of copyright 
protection, major firms in the industry already had begun turning to patent protection.  
Direct protection of software patents was difficult in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
1972 decision in Gottschalk v. Benson.54  Still, several of my interviews suggest that 
software patents were easy to obtain.  Because much of the software through the 1980’s 
was being produced by hardware firms, patents easily could be obtained on an object (a 
microprocessor), programmed to accomplish the relevant function.55  To be sure, that 
artifice was not effective in the 1990’s when large software-only firms like Microsoft 
started to play major roles, because firms like Microsoft could appropriate the innovation 
of those patents in a software program without infringement.  By that time, however, 
46
 Menell (2002):16.
47 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 
1983) (copyright protection for Apple’s code).
48
 Merges (1996a):277-78; Menell (2002):19-20; Graham & Mowery (2002):7-8.
49
 Graham & Mowery (2002):8-9.
50
 Samuelson et al. (1994):2351.
51
 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241; Merges (1996a):277-278.
52 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.2d 1435 (1994); Menell (2002):45-46.
53
 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (no copyright protection for pull-down menus in 
spreadsheet program).
54
 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (barring patent on algorithm); see Menell (2002):16.
55
 Witek; Hill.
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patent doctrine had begun to loosen so that patent protection was available, at least to 
those firms that were sufficiently familiar with the process to exploit it.56
In sum, despite the contrary mythology of a golden age of IP freedom, it is not 
clear that there was any time when software was not protected by IP.  While copyright 
protection seemed likely to provide adequate protection, many who were active in the 
industry thought that patent protection would be counterproductive.57 Nevertheless, as it 
became increasingly clear that copyright protection would be inadequate, the supporters 
of patent protection in the industry gained force, so that many of the leading firms now 
have large numbers of patents.58  The question that this article addresses is how those 
forms of protection have developed in practice as the industry has matured.  The 
remainder of this paper investigates those questions.
III.  Interview Methodology
As in much of my past work, I use interviews to collect information about the 
common motivations and understandings of business practices that are not readily 
quantifiable.59  There are of course a number of risks in relying on interviews.  For 
example, there is the possibility that bias by the interviewer will taint the results of the 
interviews.60  That possibility is particularly important in this type of unfocused research, 
because the interview scripts are not standardized.61  There also is a significant risk that 
the sample of interview subjects will be biased in a way that reduces the accuracy of the 
information discovered in the interviews.62 As discussed below, I have done what seems 
practicable to minimize those risks.  In my view, however, the richness of the information 
available from this method far outweighs the methodological concerns.63  The appropriate 
response is to proceed with caution in making firm empirical conclusions from the 
interviews.
56
 Merges (1996a):278-81; Menell (2002):15; Graham & Mowery (2002):9.
57 LESSIG (2001):207-08; Merges (2002):15; Graham & Mowery (2002):10-11.
58
 A companion paper with John Allison analyzes the patents of the leading 500 software 
firms.
59
 Mann (1996); Mann (1997); Mann (1997a), Mann (1999), Mann (2002).
60 See SEIDMAN (1998): 69, 74 (discussing that problem).
61 See SEIDMAN (1998): 76-77 (discussing why interviewing scripts are inappropriate in 
this type of research); see also Daniel Bertaux, From the Life-History Approach to the 
Transformation of Sociological Practice in BIOGRAPHY AND SOCIETY: THE LIFE HISTORY 
APPROACH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 29, 38-39 (D. Bertaux ed. Int’l Sociological Ass’n 1981) 
(discussing the need for interview “scripts” to “be modified from one interview to the next * * * 
according to the progress made in the understanding of [the topic]”).
62 See SEIDMAN (1998):44-47 (discussing that problem).
63 See SEIDMAN (1998):5 (discussing the benefits of interviews to collect qualitative 
information).
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The interviews typically are about 30-45 minutes long.  I conducted all of the 
interviews personally.  As is typical in this kind of research, the interviews were open-
ended, without specifically scripted questions.64  When possible, I conducted the 
interviews in person, but many of them were conducted by telephone.  When it was 
possible and acceptable to the subject, I recorded the interview.  If that was not 
acceptable, I took notes during the interview.  Subject to confidentiality constraints 
necessary to obtain the interviews, the interview transcripts will be available on my Web 
site shortly after publication of this article.  All of the subjects are identified in the 
opening footnote of the article except where the subjects requested anonymity.  The 
transcripts include details about the positions that the subjects hold in the companies at 
which they are employed.
Because my goal is to understand how intellectual property affects financing 
practices in the industry, I attempted to speak to people who invest in startup companies –
venture capitalists, angels, and banks.  I also attempted to speak to people at software 
companies about their experiences in obtaining funding.  I also spoke to people at large 
software companies to understand the role of IP in their assessment of potential firms for 
acquisition and about the role it plays in funding R&D in their own companies.65  I also 
attempted to diversify geographically the interviews by contacting potential interview 
subjects in several of the states with large groups of software companies and venture 
capitalists (California, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington, and Michigan). 66
The interview subjects were collected using the “snowball” method.67  As is 
typical, I first used any available contacts in the industry from previous research, various 
institutional affiliations, and personal connections.68  I also read widely in relevant news 
sources and contacted a large number of investors and developers “cold” based on news 
stories about recent fundings in the industry.  As I interviewed subjects, I also asked for 
references to other potential subjects that might be willing to speak to me.  As is typical 
for my work of this sort, I was successful in getting interviews from about one out of 
every four people that I contacted.  I discerned no particular pattern in the likelihood that 
any particular person would agree to an interview.
64 See SEIDMAN (1998):69-70, 76-77.
65
 IBM and Microsoft ranked first and second in the most recent release of the Software 
500 by Software Magazine, available at www.softwaremag.com.
66
 Data I have collected for a related project indicates that about 60% of software firms 
that first received venture financing in 1998 and 1999 are located in those five states.
67 See SEIDMAN (1998):47 (discussing that method).
68
 This methodology is common in these types of inquiries.  For example, see Hindle & 
Rushworth (2001).  For examples of a similar methodology by other legal academics, see Baker 
(2001); Bernstein (2001); Bernstein (1996); Bernstein (1992); Black & Coffee (1994), Schlanger 
(2003).
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IV.  VC Investment
I turn now to the results of the interviews, the subject of the remaining three parts 
of the paper.  Because my focus in this project is on understanding the ways in which IP 
protection might facilitate funding of software startups, I begin in this part with a general 
discussion of the nature and purposes of venture-capital investment.  The next part 
discusses copyright protection.  The final part discusses patent protection.
The development of cutting-edge software is an expensive and time-consuming 
task.  Thus, it is not common for a successful product to be developed by an individual 
developer working in his spare time.  Rather, most commercial software products are the 
result of years of time and effort.  That time and effort, in turn, inevitably requires the 
expenditure of considerable monetary resources.  Of course, young firms can – and 
normally are expected to – go a considerable way toward developing their concept 
without using the funds of third parties.  At some point, however, they will exhaust their 
own resources and the readily available resources of friends and family members.69 At 
that point, in most cases, the firm will turn to institutional investment.
The most common70 source of that investment is a venture capitalist.71  Generally, 
venture capital firms are intermediaries that raise funds from institutional investors 
(corporate pension plans and the like) and invest those funds in startup companies in 
technology areas.72  There is a vast literature on the structure of the industry, including 
detailed studies of many aspects of the contract structures that those firms use in dealing 
with their investors and with the portfolio companies in which they invest.73 For the 
69 See MAY & SIMMONS (2001):32-33 (discussing the use of “friends-and-family” money 
before turning to institutional financing).
70
 Angel investors provide a source of financing that is parallel (or, in some cases, 
preliminary) to venture-capital investment.  Their role in particularly early stages is evident in the 
results of one survey finding that angels provide initial funding for more small, high-growth 
companies than venture capitalists.  See MAY & SIMMONS (2001):32.  {That does not suggest that 
angels finance more firms than venture capitalists, only that they are particularly common in the 
earliest stages of a firm’s development.  Even in those cases, venture capital funding is likely to 
be important at some stage of the firm’s development.}  Angel investors tend to be successful 
business executives investing the profits from their earlier endeavors in a much less formal way 
than venture capitalists.  For a general discussion, see MAY & SIMMONS. The limited interviews 
with angel investors and the scant literature on the subject suggest that the perspective of the 
typical angel investor is quite similar to the venture-capital perspective that the text discusses in 
detail.  See MAY & SIMMONS (2001):170-71 (reporting advice from Guy Kawasaki); Jackson 
Interview; Lord Interview.
71
 For a discussion of the impact of venture capital financing on small firms and the 
economy as a whole, see GOMPERS & LERNER (2001):41-83.
72
 For a general discussion of how venture-capital organizations operate, see GOMPERS & 
LERNER (2001):87-115.
73
 For a wide-ranging collection of quantitative analysis of those topics, see GOMPERS & 
LERNER (2000).  For a good summary, see Klausner & Litvak (2001).
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purpose of this study, however, the structure of the venture capitalist is relatively 
unimportant.  What is important for this study is understanding as precisely as possible 
what characteristics of a portfolio firm are important in leading a venture capitalist to 
invest.  The premise of intellectual property protection is that the monopoly that it grants 
on the exploitation of a covered technology will cause investment to flow into the firm 
that has created the technology.  The reason why the monopoly could support such a flow 
of investment is that the monopoly – at least in theory – could create market power that 
would allow the firm to earn supranormal profits by exploiting the technology in 
question.
The first point to understand about startup companies is that the uniqueness of the 
firm’s product is not likely to be one of the primary issues a potential venture capital 
investor will analyze in deciding whether to invest in the firm.74  Rather, the typical 
investor is likely to start by focusing on basic issues that validate the core competency of 
the firm to execute its concept successfully.75  For example, investors will be interested in 
such things as expertise in the relevant market and the skills of the management team.76
One remarked: “Every company of mine that has failed has been mismanagement of 
executives, not technical failure.”77  Similarly, even before investors consider whether a 
firm can protect a position as a market leader, they will want to know whether their 
product is one that customers need so desperately that the firm can gain a significant 
place in the market.78
Still, for firms that have a credible product idea and the expertise to implement it, 
venture capitalists plainly accept the basic idea that their goal is to identify firms that will 
have sufficient market power to earn extraordinary profits.  Intellectual property 
protection is important only indirectly, as a tool that sometimes can provide that market 
power.  The key is, in the words of one of my most lucid interview subjects, “sustainable 
74
 A typical comment is that entrepreneurs are naïve if they think they have discovered a 
valuable product idea for which there is no competition:  “This is complete and utter BS.  Every 
product has competition, even if it’s just ‘I want to keep my money.’”  ADAMS (2002):20-21.  
Indeed, the absence of competition generally is regarded as a bad signal, because it suggests that 
the idea is not worth pursuing.  See ADAMS (2002):21 (arguing that “the existence of competition 
* * * functions as its own form of market validation”); MAY & SIMMONS (2001):170.
75 See Harding Interview:2 (“There are competitors that probably have equally as good 
software [as we do, but] they can’t do the implementations [for the customers].”).
76 See ADAMS (2002):27-39 (discussing “execution intelligence”), 125-52 (discussing the 
importance of the management team in securing funding); MAY & SIMMONS, supra note 69, at 
171.
77
 Lee Interview: 2; see Subhedar Interview:1 (“The most important thing is execution.”).
78 See ADAMS (2002):49-68 (discussing “market validation” and the need to develop a 
product that responds to customer “pain”); Gauer Interview:2 (“The point is whether there is a 
pain point in the market to which these people are going to apply a pain reliever.”); Kielb 
Interview:1.
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differentiation”79: something special about the particular firm that will enable it to do 
something that its competitors will not be able to do for the foreseeable future.  The 
interviews also reflect more picturesque terminology – referring to “secret sauce”80 or 
“magic dust.”81 It is clear that the key to a desirable investment opportunity is in the 
expectation of market power, with all other attributes of the company being indirect 
predictors of that ultimate goal.82
For example, it was common for investors to refer to lead-time or first-mover 
advantages.83  The premise of those discussions was that a portfolio company that truly 
was the first to provide a sophisticated and functional response to an important problem 
could expect to earn a supranormal return for years to come.  Interestingly enough, the 
expectation generally rested on the perception that a firm could maintain a lead on its 
rivals as long as it kept improving its technology as quickly as its competitors.84  I rarely 
if ever heard investors (as opposed to developers) who expected portfolio firms to obtain 
and retain a strong market position through “lock-in” or “bandwagon” effects.85
79
 Lee Interview:1.
80
 Lee Interview:1.
81 See Weghorst Interview:3.
82 See Rightmer Interview:1 (comment of developer that IP “is a check-list item on 
[VC’s] list.  What they’re really looking for is barriers to entry.”); Subhedar Interview:1 (“[T]here 
could be patent protection, but that in and of itself is not what you’re looking for.  Really what 
you’re looking for is how are you going to sustain your position.”).
83 See ADAMS (2002):73-94 (discussing importance of getting to the market quickly); 
D’Eath Interview:6; E. Jones Interview:2-3 (discussing benefits of an “installed base” of users in 
maintaining recognition as a market leader); Rightmer Interview:1 (explaining that his firm’s 
success hinges on getting customers to “lock-in” to his product because they can afford to change 
products “only once every ten years”); Sikora Interview:1.
84 See D’Eath Interview:6; Kielb Interview:2; Sikora Interview:1 (arguing that his firm’s 
lead time of 6 months over its competitors is important:  “9 women can’t make a baby in one 
month.  There are problems that just take a certain amount of time to solve”); Weghorst 
Interview:3) (“Sustainable differences are typically time and materials put into [the software].”).
{The Sikora quote apparently is an allusion to a famous comment by IBM chairman Tom 
Watson, Jr. related to development of the seminal OS/360 software product: “The bearing of a 
child takes nine months, no matter how many women are assigned.”  Quoted in CAMPBELL-
KELLY & ASPRAY (1996):199.}
85
 “Lock-in” or “bandwagon” effects occur when the value of a particular technology 
increases with the number of other users, and have the potential to allow a particular technology 
to remain dominant even when later, superior technologies appear on the market.  For general 
discussion, see ROHLFS (2001); see also LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS (1999) (arguing that inefficient 
lock-in rarely occurs, with numerous examples from the software industry).
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That is not to say that intellectual property protection is not important.  It is clear, 
however, that different investors have different views about it.86  Some feel that 
intellectual property always is important, and claim that they never invest without strong 
patentable technology.87  However, even those investors often go on to say that they are 
not as interested in the IP protection as in technology that is sufficiently cutting-edge to 
warrant protection.88  Others, however, particularly those that emphasize early-stage 
companies, say that IP protection is generally unimportant for software investments.89
Still others take a middle position, holding that IP protection matters some, but not all, of 
the time.90  Most of those who addressed the subject recognized differing perspectives on 
the point and argued that those with differing perspectives are misguided.91  The most 
likely explanation is that the different investors are simply implementing different 
investment models based on their particular expertise.92
V. The Role of Copyright
The software industry presents a puzzle for the law of copyright.  On the one 
hand, the purpose of copyright law is to protect expression, as opposed to ideas or 
functionality.93  Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest that the 
Constitution could forbid an extension of copyright law beyond the protection of 
86 Cf. GOMPERS & LERNER (2000):47 (discussing a variety of investment perspectives 
without specifically referring to IP protection).
87 See Inman Interview:1; Lee Interview:1; Jackson Interview:4; Murphree Interview:1.
88 See Lee Interview:1 (suggesting that the “next step” is whether you want to “open your 
kimono” a little bit by having the technology registered for protection).
89 See Adams Interview:1 (“Quite frankly from an investor’s standpoint, IP protection 
doesn’t mean a whole lot.”); Denniston Interview:1 (“Software is unique in that we don’t look for 
IP protection.”); Gauer Interview:2 (“[P]atentable work tends to correlate with working in new 
areas and being world-class in those areas but I would never make an investment decision based 
on whether there is a patent or not or whether I thought a patent application would be 
successful.”); E. Jones Interview:2 (looking for “something unique” rather than something that is 
patented because patents are not worth the expense in most software investments); Treybig 
Interview:1 “[P]atents imply a contribution, it helps evaluate the company and what they’re 
creating that’s different, that can let them win.”).
90
 Stephenson Interview:1.
91 Compare Inman Interview:1 (criticizing investors who “claimed that IP was 
nonsense”), with Gauer Interview:3 (arguing that emphasis on copyright and patent protection 
illustrates that the Southern California venture-capital industry is “less mature” than the Northern 
California industry).
92
 I hope to study that question in a forthcoming paper, analyzing correlations between 
patenting practices of portfolio companies and the identity of the venture capitalists that invest.
93 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-05 (1879); Copyright Act § 102(b) (excluding from 
copyright protection “any idea * * * process, system, [or] method of operation * * * embodied in 
[a copyrightable] work”).
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expression.94  On the other hand, the purpose of software products is to enhance the 
functionality of the computers (or other objects) that the software operates.95  How, then, 
can copyright function as an integral part of the system for providing intellectual-property 
protection for software?96
One answer is that it is a historical accident.  Within a few years of the birth of the 
software industry in the 1960’s, the question of how software should be protected became 
bound up with the lengthy project to reform the Copyright Act of 1909.  Shortly after that 
project finally resulted in the Copyright Act of 197697 – the basis for copyright law to this 
day – software was firmly entrenched in the statute: Section 101 specifically defines a 
“computer program” and the statute includes a variety of rules designed to bring software 
into the statute.98  Yet, what Congress did not do was reconcile the fundamental tension 
in using a statute consciously limited to protection of expression to bolster an industry 
dedicated to enhancing the utility of computers.
Because of the importance of the software industry in the United States economy,
it is not surprising that the courts eventually had to grapple with this tension.  As 
discussed above, a series of cases in the early 1990’s struggled to distinguish between the 
expressive and functional elements of computer programs, granting protection to the 
former but denying protection to the latter.99 Similarly, courts have struggled with cases 
94
 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (discussing 
originality requirement).
95 See Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First 
Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 122-23 
(2002).
96
 For previous notices of this puzzle, see, e.g., Abramson, supra note 95, at 77-78, 122-
23; Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer Software 
and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 53, 53-54 (1997); Pamela 
Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the 
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2350 (1994) (“Copyright law 
is mismatched to software, in part, because it does not focus on the principal source of value in a 
program (its useful behavior).”).
97
 For a comprehensive and critical discussion of the development of that Act, see Jessica 
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
98 See Karjala, supra note 96, at 72-77 (discussing those rules).
99 E.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986) 
(copyright protection for most aspects of software program); Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai, 982 
F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1992) (more limited protection through an abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test); Autoskill, Inc. v. Nat’l Edu. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(copyright protection for software keying procedure); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 
807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (no copyright 
protection for keystrokes necessary to operate Lotus spreadsheet).  For discussion and 
categorization of such cases, see Abramson, supra note 95, at 123-24, 131-32; Karjala, supra note 
96, at 78-112; Menell (2002):20-29.
Software IP July 13, 2004 Draft18
18
involving reverse engineering.  Those cases generally justify rules that permit parties that 
are engaged in functional development to use expressive aspects of the programs in ways 
that otherwise would be prohibited.100 More abstractly, leading academics have struggled 
to develop coherent frameworks within which to provide appropriate IP protection for 
software innovation.  Some – most notably Pamela Samuelson and her co-authors – have 
suggested entirely new bodies of law.101  Others, the most successful of whom probably 
is Dennis Karjala, have worked to find coherence in the overlapping protections that 
copyright and patent afford.102
Stepping back from that doctrinal and scholarly morass, the key question in 
evaluating this body of law should be how well its extension to the software industry 
serves its fundamental purposes.103  After a quarter of a century, enough time has elapsed 
to examine that question empirically.  Starting from the premise that the fundamental 
purpose of the intellectual-property system is to stimulate production in the covered 
sectors of the economy,104 the basic question for me is how – and whether – copyright 
law facilitates the flow of money to enterprises engaged in the business of software 
innovation.
That is not a question readily susceptible of quantification.  Unlike patent 
protection, copyright protection is not dependent on a decision to register an innovation 
with a government office; the protection attaches when the software is written.105
100
 The leading case is Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 
1992) (allowing Accolade to reverse engineer Sega’s programs to create Sega-compatible games).  
For discussion, see Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: 
Intellectual Property Implications of ‘Lock-out’ Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995); 
Karjala, supra note 96, at 112-16; Menell (2002):29-46; David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A 
Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least As Far As It Goes, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1131 
(1994).
101 Samuelson et al., supra note 96, at 2378-420.
102 See Karjala, supra note 96; Menell (2002) (arguing that the “thin” protection 
copyright provides for software does not interfere with the protection afforded by patent law).
103
 There is comparatively little scholarship on how well copyright functions even in the 
core literary industries for which it was developed.  For one significant example of an effort to 
examine that question, see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright 
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
104 E.g., Karjala, supra note 96, at 53; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing 
copyright protection “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”).
105
 Graham & Mowery (2002) analyze data about copyright registrations by large 
packaged software firms, which indicate that large firms are registering their software copyrights 
less frequently than they once did.  It is difficult to draw conclusions from that data given the 
limited connection between registration and copyright protection and the obvious reasons why 
parties might not register software even when they wished to rely on copyright protection.  Mann 
(1999).
Software IP July 13, 2004 Draft19
19
Accordingly, the only practicable way to understand the significance that copyright has 
for the industry is to understand the role it plays in the business decisions of those in the 
industry.  The basic problem is to determine whether the remnants of copyright protection 
for software play any significant role in the modern software industry.  This part of the 
paper assesses that question in three steps.  First, it explains why copyright cannot 
provide the sustainable differentiation that investors seek when they assess potential 
investments.  Second, it discusses the special case of lenders, who plainly are interested 
in copyright protection.  Third, it discusses the role of copyright in later stage software 
firms.
A.  The Role of Copyright in Startups
For purposes of this paper, the key question is the extent to which copyright 
protection can provide the kind of sustainable differentiation that is important to 
investors.  On that specific question, the answer is a resounding “no.”  The basic problem 
with copyright protection for software is that the legal system for copyright is designed 
not to protect functionality.  Because functionality in most cases is the aspect of software 
products that makes them attractive to customers,106 the differentiation that is important 
to investors is differentiation in functionality.  Thus, if the legal system works as 
designed, copyright should be useless at this point.
My interviews strongly supported that perspective.  For example, a typical startup 
executive explained that copyright protection “is not useful to us [because of its inability 
to protect functionality].  The other person could do just the same thing in a different 
manner and get around it very easily.”107  Another argued: “I’ve been in the software 
106
 There are, of course, types of software for which functionality is not of central 
importance.  Video games, for example, are software products for which the expressive content is 
the primary market differentiator.  What that means for my purposes is that the relevant IP 
protections for video games should look much more like those for traditional audiovisual works 
(such as motion pictures) than those for software programs.  Knowledgeable industry executives 
recognize this distinction as crucial in the negotiation of contracts related to the exploitation of 
those works.  See Interview with Jeffrey Koontz, Senior Attorney, Consumer Group, Microsoft 
(Feb. 4, 2003, Redmond, WA) [hereinafter Koontz Interview] [transcript on file with author] 
(transcript at 1).
107
 Harding Interview, supra note 75 (transcript at 1); see Telephone Interview with Rob 
Beauchamp, Chief Technology Officer, Journee (Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Beauchamp 
Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 8) (“To what extent does [copyright] keep 
people from stealing your ideas or your product? None.”); Telephone Interview with Tim 
Costello, President, Builder Homesite (Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Costello Interview] [transcript 
on file with author] (transcript at 1) (“Generally, I think that most people in the software industry 
don’t think it is worth all that much.”); Telephone Interview with Ken Kalinoski, Chief 
Technology Officer, Forgent (Feb. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Kalinoski Interview] [transcript on file 
with author] (transcript at 8) (“I’ve seen enough of copyright litigation and the issues with 
copyright law that don’t have any real bite.  They don’t have – * * * there is no impact. * * * 
[P]eople think that by having copyright * * * that no one can really copy things * * * and it just 
doesn’t stand up in the marketplace.”); Telephone Interview with Anne Kelley, Senior Attorney, 
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business for 20 years.  Copyrights are worthless.  They are totally worthless.”108  One 
thoughtful executive opined:
Copyright solves one problem, which is the whole or partial copying of an expressive 
application.  The whole or partial copying of an application by a pirate you can get.  But 
it doesn’t really protect us from sharing our technical information broadly and a company 
then understanding how our products work.  Patents are inter-industry mechanisms for 
creating value.  Copyright is creating protection between the industry and the channel or 
end customers.109
Thus, a common theme was that copyright was not just of small value, but completely 
unknown to executives at startups.  For example, one experienced lawyer opined that 
“[f]or startup companies, the Copyright Office is a foreign place.”110
The most obvious problem with that argument relates to reverse engineering.111
Generally, the expression that copyright protects in computer software is in the lines of 
Patents, Microsoft (Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Kelley Interview] [transcript on file with author] 
(transcript at 1) (“What really it does come down to is what is the thing that is marketable and if 
this thing that is particularly marketable is functionality, then the patent is clearly playing a more 
important role.”).  For similar comments from venture-capital investors, see E. Jones Interview, 
supra note 83 (transcript at 2) (“We don’t make copyright a big issue.”); Lee Interview, supra
note 77 (transcript at 1) (copyright is “not a focus area for us” because it is “not useful”); 
Murphree Interview, supra note 87 (transcript at 1).
108
 Adams Interview, supra note 89 (transcript at 1).
109
 Interview with David Kaefer, Director, Corporate Initiatives, Microsoft (Feb. 4, 2003, 
Redmond, WA) [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 2).  For a similar emphasis on the 
vertical – rather than horizontal – value of copyright protection, see D’Eath Interview, supra note 
83 (transcript at 6) (“If somebody goes and takes the actual code that is a pretty stupid way of 
competing.  No valid competitor is going to just take the product and steal the code.”).  As I 
discuss below (Section V(C)(1)), copyright’s role in preventing piracy is arguably its most 
important role in the software context.
110
 Interview with Edward A. Cavazos, Partner, Andrews & Kurth, LLP (Sept. 17, 2002, 
Austin, TX) (transcript at 1) [transcript on file with author]; see Telephone Interview with 
Michael Abbott, President, Composite Software (Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Abbott Interview] 
[transcript on file with author] (transcript at 8) (“[The costs [for copyright protection] are not too 
significant but I’m not as knowledgeable frankly, in that area, as some of the patents.”); D’Eath 
Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 6) (referring to registration requirements, complained that 
copyright “to me is more of an annoyance than it is a real protection”); Weghorst Interview, 
supra note 81 (transcript at 1) (“In the early days of software start-ups * * * copyright protection 
is not even on the radar screen in terms of importance.”).
111
 There is a terminological complication in the discussion that follows.  To some, 
“reverse engineering” has a narrow meaning that implies an effort to duplicate existing source 
code precisely.  See, e.g., infra note 114 (discussing sources that take that perspective).  In most 
of my interviews, however, it was plain in context that “reverse engineering” referred more 
broadly to an effort to recreate functionality, without regard to recreating existing source code.
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code of which the program consists.112  Thus, although copyright does not prohibit a 
competitor from writing a completely new program that includes the functionality of the 
existing program, it does generally bar a competitor from taking the existing code to 
produce that program.113  Thus, the effect of that protection turns on an empirical 
question: how effective as an exclusionary device is it to require a competitor to rewrite a 
competing program instead of reusing the code?
Surprisingly enough, my interviews indicate quite strongly that it is not effective.  
The perception is that in most instances a software engineer that could observe the 
program in operation could readily understand the functionality that the software 
provides and with that understanding easily could write code that would provide the same 
functionality: “[S]oftware in general is very malleable and is easily reverse 
engineered.”114  As one venture investor explained: “The difficulty normally is managing 
the people, not solving the problem.  The code won’t look the same, but the functionality 
will.”115    One developer explained that the difficulty in coming up with a successful 
112 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 96, at 72-77.  There also of course is a literary work 
protected by copyright in the interfaces through which users interact with programs.  And in some 
cases at least, as with the video games discussed above, it is plausible to think that the interface 
itself could be important to the market success of the product.  To the extent that is true, copyright 
protection for the interface (which is relatively thin for the reasons discussed above) would have 
the potential to exclude competitors by making reverse engineering illegal.  As the text suggests, 
that seems to me an inappropriate application of copyright doctrine.  See Karjala, supra note 96, 
at 75-77, 94-112 (arguing that copyright protection does not extend to software interfaces).
113 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 96, at 72-75.
114
 Weghorst Interview, supra note 81 (transcript at 3).  This is consistent with the 
understanding of Pamela Samuelson and her co-authors (including the noted software engineer 
Mitchell Kapor, who contend that the know-how of software is for the most part “near the 
surface” and readily extractible through testing.  Samuelson et al., supra note 96, at 2333-37; see 
also id. at 2317-20 (arguing that programs with different code but identical behavior are market 
substitutes).  But cf. Abramson, supra note 95, at 128 (expressing doubt about utility of “black-
box testing”); Strasser (2001):23 (similar perspective).  Abramson and Strasser address reverse 
engineering designed to recreate the existing source code.  I share their view that it would be 
difficult to do that.  As the text and Samuelson’s discussion recognize, however, it is clear that the 
goal of the typical reverse engineer is not to reproduce the existing source code as much as to 
understand and reproduce the functionality that the source code effects.  See supra note 111.  I 
see no reason to doubt the value of “black-box testing” for that task.
115
 Lee Interview, supra note 77 (transcript at 1); see Murphree Interview, supra note 87
(transcript at 1); Stephenson Interview, supra note 90 (transcript at 1) (“Copyright only protects 
the particular source code, the instantiation, the physical lines of code that you wrote.  And in 
software there are a number of different ways to accomplish the same thing.”); id. (“And plus, the 
bigger point is that all you really get is protection on that particular instantiation.  If they change * 
* * and they’re not violating that copyright, then it’s not really doing that much good.  Because 
ultimately what you want to protect is the functionality.”).  For similar views from developers see 
Interview with Tom Bishop, Chief Technology Officer, Vieo (Jan. 28, 2003, Austin, TX) 
[hereinafter Bishop Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 2) (arguing that 
reverse engineering is easy when the ideas in a product are “what the customer wants”; Like 
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enterprise software product is not writing the code, but understanding the problem that 
needs to be solved.116  Thus, the only IP protection that would make it difficult to 
duplicate a program’s functionality would be patent protection – which would bar a 
competitor from writing code that includes any patented aspects of the software’s 
functionality.
That is not to say that producing a program that adopts a competitor’s product 
features is always trivially easy.  For one thing, there plainly are differing views in the 
industry.  Although their views seem to me against the weight of the evidence, some 
apparently knowledgeable commentators continue to insist that reverse engineering in 
fact is quite difficult.117 For me, the most powerful evidence of the ease of reverse 
engineering is the steps that software companies take to render it more difficult.  Thus, all 
of the companies with whom I discussed the subject took some steps to ensure that their 
competitors would not have access to their software code.118  The most common and 
time-honored tactic rests on the distinction between a program’s more comprehensible 
“source code” and its less comprehensible “object code.”119  Thus, many commercial 
developers traditionally have kept the more comprehensible source code secret, 
[graphic user interfaces], once you know that’s what people want, easy to do.”); Costello 
Interview, supra note 107 (transcript at 1) (“[T]he general problem [with copyright protection] is 
there are a million ways to go around it.  And I think that is true for almost all IP in software.”); 
Kalinoski Interview, supra note 107 (transcript at 9) ([Your competitors a]re at least smart 
enough to go modify and have something that’s VERY * * * similar.  It’s got the same attributes.  
It’s got a lot of the same qualities, but it looks just a little bit [different even if] it’s obvious where 
they got all of their thinking.”); Rightmer Interview, supra note 82 (transcript at 2) (“Reverse 
engineering is easy.  Copyright protects only against blatant theft.  Ever since Lotus lost 
protection for look and feel, copyright has not seemed valuable in the industry.  We do this all the 
time for our customers, to mimic the functionality, input, and output of existing products that we 
are replacing.”).
116
 Weghorst Interview, supra note 81 (transcript at 4) (“[T]ypically, when you’re talking 
about enterprise software, * * * the magic dust, if you will, is in the domain expertise [of] 
knowing that we need to solve the problems that we needed to solve.”).
117 See Mark A. Haynes, Black Holes of Innovation in the Software Arts, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 567, 568-73 (1999) (arguing that copyright’s restrictions on reverse engineering slow 
the pace of innovation in the software industry).
118 See, e.g., Koontz Interview, supra note 106 (transcript at 1) (discussing the concern of 
game developers to prevent people from seeing their “under-the-hood” work).
119
 Basically, source code is the version of a program written in a computer language 
readily accessible to ordinary computer programmers.  Before the program is run on a computer, 
it normally is compiled into object code, which is not generally comprehensible to even the most 
skilled computer programmers.  See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY LAW 
DESK REFERENCE 559-61, 729-34 (2003); Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellectual 
Property Law? The Case Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, at 5-7.  This 
distinction, of great importance in earlier years, apparently has become less important with the 
rise of Java-based programming.  See D’Eath Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 4); Urdahl 
Interview
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distributing their products to their customers only in the form of less comprehensible 
object code.120  In some cases, firms operate as application service providers, so that the 
code for their program resides entirely on their own server, which can be protected from 
competitors more readily than the servers of their customers can.121  Other companies, 
particularly in the enterprise software sector that is the source of most innovation in the 
industry, emphasized the practical value of dealing only with large and fiscally 
responsible “Fortune 500” customers.122  Those customers, inevitably bound by license 
agreements not to redistribute the software to third parties, would not – my interview 
subjects repeatedly insisted123 – assist competitors in reverse engineering efforts.124  A 
typical example: “[W]e’re selling to an enterprise customer.  We’re not on a store shelf.  
So I’m not at risk of somebody copying the disk and just cloning what I do.”125  A few 
discussed more low-tech approaches, such as delivering the code in a module secured by 
120 See Abramson, supra note 95, at 77: Strasser:7.  Several of my interview subjects rely 
on that practice.  Abbott Interview, supra note 110 (transcript at 8); Rightmer Interview, supra
note 82 (transcript at 2); Sikora Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 1).  The “open-source” 
movement is in large part defined by its complete rejection of that practice – a program cannot 
qualify as open-source if the developer does not make the source code publicly available.  For the 
authoritative definition of “open-source”, see The Open Source Definition (Version 1.9) (2003) 
available at http://opensource.org/docs/definition.php (last visited May 22, 2003).  See generally
MARTIN FINK, THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS OF LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE (2003) (general 
discussion of the open-source business model).  In recent years, even commercial developers 
have begun to make their source code more widely available, at least to reliable customers and 
business partners.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corporation, Shared Source Licensing Programs (2003), 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/Licensing/default.mspx (last 
visited May 22, 2003).
121 See Harding Interview, supra note 75 (transcript at 2).
122 See Bishop Interview, supra note 115 (transcript at 3); D’Eath Interview, supra note 
83 (transcript at 4); Rightmer Interview, supra note 82 (transcript at 2).
123 See D’Eath Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 4); Rightmer Interview, supra note 
82 (transcript at 2) (“Our clients (Circuit City, Home Depot, and the like) won’t do that.”); 
Weghorst Interview, supra note 81 (transcript at 2-3) (commenting that the Fortune 500 
companies that are his customers are more concerned about compliance than he is “because 
they’re the ones with the deep pockets and the heavy exposure”).
124
 The Federal Circuit recently has upheld a provision in a license agreement preventing 
reverse engineering.  Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (2002).  But cf. Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (1998).  For a cogent argument for a contrary result, 
see David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of 
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992) 
(arguing that federal intellectual-property policy preempts state contract law that would prevent 
reverse engineering); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and 
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1660 (2002) (making a similar 
argument for economic reasons).
125
 D’Eath Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 6).
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a lock to prohibit access by the customer.126  The import of those efforts, of course, is that 
copyright protection is not effective to prevent reverse engineering by competitors.
Indeed, a number of my interview subjects went even farther.  Those executives 
argued that such efforts are wasteful, because access to the actual code is not useful for 
most types of reverse engineering.  Those executives argued that the need to integrate the 
reverse-engineered software into the operating environment of the competitor would 
make it counterproductive to start from the code of the originating innovator.127  It 
normally would be easier, they say, to start from scratch writing code to implement the 
observed functionality, than it would be to start from the existing code and alter that code 
to match the reverse engineer’s existing environment.  From that perspective, the 
emphasis on code that is at the foundation of copyright protection renders it entirely 
irrelevant to the protection of the startup firm’s work in process.
B. The Role of Collateral in Startup Lending
There is one area in which investors in startup firms show particular interest in 
copyright protection.  That area is investments by lenders (principally banks).  As I have 
discussed in my earlier work, those lenders often take a security interest in copyrights 
held by the portfolio firm.128  At first glance, that practice is in considerable tension with 
the assertions in the preceding section about the general irrelevance of copyright 
protection in the process of attracting funding to software-developing startup firms.
A closer examination of the lender’s practices shows, however, that they are in 
fact consistent with my thesis.  The key is the purpose of the lender’s security interest.  
As my previous article explains, the purpose of those security interests cannot plausibly 
be to ensure that the loan is collected through a repossession and foreclosure of the 
126 See Bishop Interview, supra note 115 (transcript at 3) (“We call it ‘ASP in a box.”  
Access to the box is limited.  Hard to lift up the cover.  They couldn’t open the box w/o us 
knowing. * * * They can see what goes in and out of the box, but they can’t replicate the brain.  
Just like Jack Nicklaus.”).
127 See also D’Eath Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 7) (discussing how hard it 
would be to understand his product just by looking at the code); Interview with Rod Favaron, 
President and CEO, and Phil Gilbert, Executive Vice President and CTO, Lombardi Software 
(Feb. 27, 2003, Austin, TX).  For a similar academic perspective, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, 
supra note 124, at 1613-15 (arguing that object-code reverse-engineering generally is not useful).
128
 Mann, Software Financing, supra note 59, at 175-76; see Interview with Marc 
Cadieux, Division Manager (Peninsula Region), Silicon Valley Bank (Feb. 6, 2003, Santa Clara, 
CA) [hereinafter Cadieux Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 11); Interview 
with Timothy Klitch, First Vice President, Comerica Incorporated (Nov. 15, 2002, Austin, TX) 
[hereinafter Klitch Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 1); Interview with 
Philip Wright, Vice President, Comerica (Dec. 3, 2002, Austin, TX) [hereinafter Wright 
Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 1).
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copyright-protected software.129  One thoughtful lender interviewed for this project 
explained:
[T]hat’s been the biggest lesson we’ve learned over the last couple of years: that reliance 
on intellectual property as an ultimate source of repayment is very unreliable, very high 
beta.  So we’ve had to focus much more on the venture relationships that we have and 
making sure that we work towards a soft landing – not letting them just run into the wall 
and then hope that when the pieces fall to the ground that we can pick up the intellectual 
property and sell it for at least our loan balance.130
Even outside the liquidation context, sophisticated lenders recognize that 
copyright protection cannot really contribute to the value of a software startup company.  
For example, one lender explained that “the enterprise value associated with intellectual 
property is an important factor in the underwriting process, but I would say that it falls 
into a spot second, third, fourth, or maybe even fifth in terms of relative priority.”131
Rather, the principal source of repayment is out of future fundings by the venture 
capitalists that typically invest simultaneously with the bank lender.132  Speaking 
specifically of early-stage lending, one lender went so far as to say that “the collateral is 
the equity investors.”133  The basic premise is that the lender is safe in relying on 
reputation if it focuses on repeat dealings with management teams134 and venture 
129
 Mann, Software Financing, supra note 59, at 175-76.  My interviews for this project 
are consistent with that view.  See Cadieux Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 5-6) 
(discussing deterioration in recoveries generated by sale of IP collateral from the early 1990’s 
until the present); David A. Jones, Executive Vice President and Chief Credit Officer, Silicon 
Valley Bank (Feb. 6, 2003, Santa Clara, CA) [hereinafter D. Jones Interview] [transcript on file 
with author] (transcript at 6) (explaining that his IP collateral “might as well be real estate in a 
ghost town”); Klitch Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 1-2).
130
 Interview with Andy Enroth, Senior Credit Officer, Silicon Valley Bank (Jan. 9, 2003, 
Austin, TX) [hereinafter Enroth Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 3).
131
 D. Jones Interview, supra note 129 (transcript at 1); see Cadieux Interview, supra note 
128 (transcript at 2) (“I would say in terms of intellectual property protection it might surprise 
you to learn that falls fairly low on the list compared to things like which VCs are in the deal, 
what space the company is in, how many other companies are already in that space, how much 
they want to borrow, who is on the board, how do we think they are going to do from a customer-
traction standpoint.”); Enroth Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 1) (“Copyright protection 
[we’re] not as focused on.  There, it’s really hard to garner whether there’s intrinsic value or not.  
That to us would not be determinative as to whether a company was valuable or not.”).
132 See D. Jones Interview, supra note 129 (transcript at 6) (“[I]nvariably our source of 
repayment is the next round [of venture financing.”).
133
 Wright Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 3).  See also Wright Interview, supra
(transcript at 1) (“It is a little risky, but we are not only relying on our collateral.  We lend money 
to people that we’re comfortable with for some reason, whether it’s because we’ve dealt with 
them or the management team or we’re very comfortable with their venture capital sponsors.”).
134
 A typical anecdote:
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capitalists135 that have behaved well in the dissolution of previous unsuccessful portfolio 
companies.  Moreover, the large number of failed portfolio firms in recent years has 
provided venture capitalists and management teams the opportunity to display their 
reliability.136
I have a client now who had one of the high-flying Internet companies.  They had 
millions of dollars.  Product never really sold.  Shut it down.  The first thing they did during the 
wind- down was they said ahead of time when they still had cash, they paid off the bank early on, 
got us out of the way.  He has the world’s best credit.  He’s got another company now and we are 
very open to doing whatever we can for him, bending all the rules.  Here is a guy who took care of 
us we’re going to try to pay him back.
Wright Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 1-2).
135 See Enroth Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 3) (“For us, this is all about 
relationships, so even if the company’s technology is failing, if the investors still are supportive 
and think that there is an opportunity to sell a piece of it off or do whatever we are likely to be 
very very flexible.”); Wright Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 3) (“At the first stage, the 
collateral is the equity investors.  People like Rob Adams [of Austin Ventures] that have done a 
lot of those deals.  We’re very comfortable doing them with him.  * * * Out of the last 75 deals 
we’ve done with Austin Ventures we’ve lost $200,000 dollars or so but loaned X million dollars.  
[The loss rate] is a lot less than [is typical for our portfolio].”).  Indeed, several of the lenders 
indicated that the relationships descend to a personal level – that a bank’s decision whether to 
make a loan might turn not on the identity of the venture-capital firm, but on the particular 
individual at the firm sponsoring the investment:
[W]e know that this particular partner has behaved or reacted the way that we would hope as a 
bank, and there are other funds – and Austin Ventures actually has treated us very well – and there 
are other funds that maybe the fund as a whole has treated us real well, certain partners, but maybe 
there’s been one partner that has reacted in a completely unpredictable manner that surprised us.  
And banks don’t like being surprised.  So we’ll remember that.  And so when the next deal comes 
in that’s funded by him it may be tough for some of the line guys who are more sales-driven but 
we’ll remember.
Enroth Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 5); see D. Jones Interview, supra note 129
(transcript at 15) (“[John] Thornton [at Austin Ventures] is the guy that I might almost give him a 
$500,000 check and say, ‘All I want you to do is tell me within 24 hours of you putting the name 
on it – giving us somebody who you gave it to so I can put in on my books.’”).
136 See Enroth Interview, supra note 130 (transcript at 5) (“We’ve been through the bad 
times.  And we know that this particular partner has behaved or reacted the way that we would 
hope as a bank * * * ); D. Jones Interview, supra note 129 (transcript at 2) (noting that a prior 
failed company “wouldn’t be the black flag that it might be for most lenders, because in our space 
a high percentage of companies do not succeed”).  Lenders also report themselves to be 
constrained by reputational concerns not to move too swiftly in deciding to “MAC” a borrower –
to accelerate the borrower’s obligation to repay the debt based on a material adverse change in the 
borrower’s financial condition.  See D. Jones Interview, supra note 129 (transcript at 14-16) 
(explaining that reports of his bank MAC’ing borrowers are urban legends, and that concerns 
about future relationships are a substantial constraint in making those determinations); Klitch 
Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 2) (explaining that his bank is less prone to MAC’ing 
borrowers than competing financial institutions). 
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Thus, the purpose of the formal collateralization of the IP is to deal with one 
narrow scenario,137 in which the loan is not repaid and the borrower becomes insolvent.  
In that event, the lender wants to ensure that it has control of all of the assets – whatever 
they might be.  The point of that control is to ensure that in a bankruptcy proceeding the 
lender will have the leverage to control that proceeding as effectively as possible.138  If a 
specified asset existed – a copyright interest in a software program, for example – in 
which the lender did not have a perfected security interest, then the lender would not have 
priority (and control) with respect to the entire estate of the bankrupt borrower.139
From a bigger perspective, this suggests that copyright protection – at least from 
the perspective of the lender – is affirmatively perverse for the startup company.  The 
difficulty is that under the current system, copyright protection has two attributes that 
together make it problematic for the lender.  First, it attaches automatically – an interest 
in the developer’s software arises under the Copyright Act automatically each day as 
revisions to the software are fixed in a tangible medium of expression.140  Second, no 
matter how carefully the lender acts, the lender cannot obtain a reliably perfected security 
interest in the software.
For example, if the lender adopts the strategy of filing in the federal Copyright 
Office, it can file only with respect to registered copyrights.141  At least under current 
cases, that would give it a perfected security interest in the registered copyrights, which 
should be enforceable against both later lenders and the trustee in bankruptcy.142 The 
problem, however, is that federal filings are not available for unregistered copyrights.143
137 See Klitch Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 2) (noting that the Austin office of 
his bank had not had to do a liquidation in the preceding year (2002)).
138 See Wright Interview, supra note 128 (transcript at 2) (“We just don’t want to find out 
that there is some value and we’re not protected.”).
139
 To be sure, the lender would have some control over that asset, because it would be a 
derivative work over which the lender would have some control.  The difficulty, however, is that 
the derivative work will have been prepared “lawfully” by the copyright owner, so a copyright 
interest will arise in the owner; if registered the lender will not have acquired that interest through 
its state-law security interest. See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control 
Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 921 (2001) (arguing that the core issues in corporate reorganizations are about control of 
the assets rather than priority of distribution).
140 See Copyright Act § 102(a).  This is a major change from the Act of 1909, under 
which protection attached only when the work was “published.”  See ROBERT A. GORMAN & 
JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 384-89 (6th ed. 2002).
141
 Copyright Act § 205(c)(2).
142 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co. (Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley 
Bank), 303 F.3d 1120, 1125-28 (9th Cir. 2002).
143 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co. (Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley 
Bank), 303 F.3d 1120, 1128-31 (9th Cir. 2002).
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In addition, as a practical matter, the lender cannot cause all of the copyrights to be 
registered.  As mentioned above, copyright protection attaches each day to any revisions 
to the software that are sufficiently substantial to involve protectible expression – a minor 
threshold doubtless surpassed by any cognizable amount of work.  The time and expense 
of registering the software each time it is changed – perhaps each day – is not something 
on which a lender reasonably could insist during the course of active software 
development.144
On the other hand, suppose the lender adopts the strategy of filing in the state 
UCC records.  At least under current cases, that should give the lender a perfected 
security interest in unregistered copyrights.145  The problem with that strategy is that it is 
difficult for the lender to ensure that none of the copyrights is registered.  If the borrower 
later happens to register the software, the lender’s security interest probably becomes 
ineffective at the time of registration.  Moreover, unless the lender files again in the 
federal records at the time of registration – something it can do of course only if it is 
aware of the registration in advance – it risks losing priority to a later lender.146
That all would be fine if the copyright protection – like the patent protection –
itself were a valuable asset to the startup.  Then, the accretion of that protection to the 
borrower’s pool of assets would be something valuable in which the lender 
understandably would want an interest.  As discussed above, however, copyright 
protection really does little or nothing of value for the startup.  Moreover, if the lender’s 
only reason for wanting a perfected security interest were to make sure that it is perfected 
in the entire balance sheet, the lender’s task would be simpler if the system were 
reformed in a sensible manner.  For example, the system could work if copyright 
protection did not attach until the software was registered and if the security interest in 
the unregistered software automatically attached to the registered work that resulted from 
the unregistered work.  More boldly, the system could be reformed so that all security 
interests in copyrights were taken under state law.147
C.  The Role Of Copyright In Later-Stage Firms
The previous part’s skepticism about the utility of copyright for startups should 
not be read to suggest that copyright is not important in the software industry.  On the 
144 See Mann, Software Financing, supra note 59, at 146-47, 150-51.
145 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co. (Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley 
Bank), 303 F.3d 1120, 1128-31 (9th Cir. 2002).
146 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co. (Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley 
Bank), 303 F.3d 1120, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2002) (frankly noting the problem).
147
 The legislative history of the Copyright Act suggests that the statutory requirement of 
federal filings was intentional (however impractical), so the removal of that requirement would be 
a significant policy retreat.  See Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Legislative 
Process and Commercial Law: Lessons from the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 48 BUS. LAWY. 437, 453-66 (1993)
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contrary, it is plain that copyright plays a crucial role in the industry’s ability to 
appropriate returns from the innovation that it produces.  That role has several aspects, 
but two are sufficiently pervasive that they can be characterized as structural: the 
prevention of piracy and the control of “theft” of code by departing employees and the 
like.148
1.  Piracy
On the first point, the discussion above explains that copyright protection is 
unimportant for the startup firm because literal copying of the code is not that important 
to the competitors of the startup.  There is one group, however, that would be quite 
interested in a free right to copy the startup’s product: its customers.  Thus, where patent 
and trade secret protection are much more important in limiting the ability of competitors 
– horizontal peers in the industry – to take technology from the innovator, copyright is 
much more important in limiting the ability of customers to obtain the product without 
paying the product’s owner.149
That problem – piracy, to use the industry’s preferred term – affects different 
types of software differently.  For example, it is less important in the enterprise software 
market in this country.  As discussed above,150 there are reliable methods of limiting 
piracy in that market, including license terms that are effective to prevent authorized 
distributees from transmitting the software code to third parties.  Key to the effectiveness 
of those provisions is the likelihood that the customers will be large and creditworthy 
firms.  Those types of firms are unlikely to participate in illicit distribution of software 
code, if only because of the likely financial exposure they would incur if their 
participation were discovered.  In some markets, however, those protections are not 
useful.  Most obviously, they are not valuable in markets (such as consumer markets) in 
which software code (in any form) is freely distributed.151  Even in this country, it is 
apparent that consumers commonly violate the terms of license agreements, copying and 
148
 I expect to explore this topic further in a paper analyzing the types of cases brought 
under the Copyright Act.  For example, data from the Northern District of California for 2002 
shows that out of the 90 copyright cases, 27 involved software.  Of the 22 software-copyright 
cases for which I could obtain a complaint, the majority (15) involved claims of unauthorized 
distribution of the copyright owner’s product.  Of the remaining seven, four involved claims 
against competitors for wrongful reverse engineering, and three arose out of contract disputes 
between web-site developers and their customers.
149 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (articulating a distinction between vertical 
and horizontal protection).
150 See supra pages 22-24.
151 See D’Eath Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 7) (“That answer is going to be very 
different for somebody who is selling a retail product.”); Kelley Interview, supra note 107
(transcript at 2) (emphasizing importance of copyright protection for mass-market software); see 
also Karjala, supra note 96, at 67 (“[O]nce * * * programs are distributed in object-code form, 
they can be copied almost without cost in large numbers.”).
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transferring software in ways that – if the licensor software publisher had its way – would 
require payment from the new user.
Executives generally recognize that in other countries the problem is a serious one 
even in the enterprise-software context.152  For reasons that range from an intentional 
governmental design to foster piracy to mere lackadaisical toleration of piracy, the extent 
of piracy in many foreign countries is shocking: industry statistics indicate that in many 
countries less than 20% of software distributed in the country is distributed through 
lawful channels.153
For several reasons, copyright is the only effective IP protection against piracy.154
For example, even if the pirated software is protected in part by a patent, a suit against 
the pirate challenging patent infringement necessarily would be more difficult, because of 
the need for the software owner to establish the validity of the patent.  Because of the 
high standard of patentability, it always will be difficult for the patent owner to get over 
152 See Adams Interview, supra note 89 (transcript at 1) (discussing piracy of Lotus in 
Italy); Interview with Tim Cranton, Senior Attorney, Microsoft (Feb. 4, 2003, Redmond, WA) 
[hereinafter Cranton Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 1); D’Eath Interview, 
supra note 83 (transcript at 7) (“Because [if you sell overseas] you then in fact could have 
somebody just copying it, in France or Germany or somewhere where they’re not watching.”); 
Telephone Interview with Annmarie Levins, Associate General Counsel, Worldwide Sales 
Group, Microsoft (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Levins Interview] [transcript on file with author] 
(transcript at 1) (discussing major businesses engaged in piracy in Eastern Europe); Sikora 
Interview, supra note 83 (transcript at 1) (offering examples of Russia and China); see also
Cranton Interview, supra (transcript at 2) (suggesting that enforcement of copyright protection 
over the Internet is similar to enforcement in a developing country).
153 See IDC & the Business Software Alliance, Expanding Global Economies: The 
Benefits of Reducing Software Piracy (Apr. 2, 2003) (copy on file with author) (reporting piracy 
rates of 94% for Vietnam, 92% for China, 88% for Indonesia, and 87% for Russia and for 
Ukraine).  Nor is the problem limited to Asia and the former Soviet Union.  The IDC data suggest 
that piracy also is rampant in countries in Europe (Bulgaria and Romania 75%, Croatia 67%, 
Greece 64%), the Middle East (Kuwait 76%), and Latin America (Costa Rice 64% and Argentina 
62%).
154 See Interview with Dan Crouse, Deputy General Counsel, Patents, Microsoft (Feb. 4, 
2003, Redmond, WA) [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 1) (“[C]opyright remains 
incredibly important for us [at Microsoft].  Without that piracy on a worldwide basis as a form of 
competition – it would be hard for people to sustain a business against.”); Karjala, supra note 96, 
at 67 (“Because the evil to be avoided was * * * slavish copying, especially slavish electronic 
copying, because copyright protects at least against that, and because computer programs 
formally fit the broad definition of a literary work under copyright law, it became a natural 
candidate for the protection of programs, notwithstanding their inherent functionality.”), 69 
(arguing that “protection against piracy” should be the “policy goal of software protection under 
copyright”); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 124, at 1613 (“Copyright law protects 
programs from the cheapest and most rapid way to make a directly competing identical product, 
namely, copying program code exactly.”).
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the threshold of patentability.155  Because of the low threshold of copyrightability, it 
never will be difficult for the owner of copyrighted software to establish that the software 
includes copyrightable innovation.156 In addition, the limitations on copyright protection 
discussed above – which make copyright useless for the startup trying to protect the 
functionality of its software – will be irrelevant in the case of the pirate: the pirate by 
definition will have copied all or substantially all of the product.  Those problems are 
particularly important in the enforcement of criminal sanctions for piracy.  Statistics from 
the Department of Justice suggest that the federal government often sues pirates for 
criminal copyright infringement; there is not even a statute for criminal patent 
infringement.157
2.  Pre-Market Protection
Copyright also plays a role even before a product goes to market, in helping a 
firm prevent technology from leaking out through the actions of employees and business 
partners.  The most obvious problem is policing the activity of departing employees.  It is 
common in all startup sectors – including the software sector – for employees rapidly to 
move from firm to firm.  Indeed, Ron Gilson argues with considerable force that 
California rules limiting the ability of firms to prevent those moves are crucial to the 
success of the venture-capital industry in Silicon Valley.158 Yet, it is one thing for 
employers to allow the cross-pollination of employees and their human capital and 
experiences.  It is quite another for their employees to take substantial chunks of 
“product” out the door with them and sell that product from their new company.
Copyright protection is central to the prevention of that activity.  Again, patent 
protection is relatively ineffective, because of the litigation costs and uncertainty of such 
litigation.  Still, in cases in which the employees attempt to reuse a substantial amount of 
155 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (principal conditions for patentability); D.C. TOEDT, THE 
LAW AND BUSINESS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE §§ 3.3 - 3.4 (2002) (discussion of patentability 
requirements as applied to computer software).
156 See Copyright Act § 102(a) (extending copyright to “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression”); ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 3.1.2 
(2003) (discussing “minimal creativity” requirement for copyright protection).
157
 For example, DOJ data shows 25 indictments of 73 defendants for criminal copyright 
infringement in 2002, but not a single indictment for criminal patent infringement.  
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2002/AppendixC.htm.  For similar views from a former 
prosecutor, see Levins Interview, supra note 152 (transcript at 1); see also Interview with Thomas 
C. Rubin, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft (Feb. 4, 2003, Redmond, WA) [hereinafter 
Rubin Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 2) (similar view from executive at 
Microsoft).
158 See ANNA LEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); Ron Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
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code from their previous firm,159 copyright law provides a simple and effective remedy 
against the new firm.160  The importance of that constraint in the system is evident from 
the discussions of corporate counsel about their diligence with respect to new 
employees161 and from venture capitalists about their investigation of potential 
investments.  The only instance in which I heard venture capitalists express concern 
about preexisting IP of other firms constraining the ability of their potential portfolio 
firms is the case in which a startup has engineers with previous experience designing a 
similar product, which raises the risk of code contamination.162  Although state-law 
causes of action based on misappropriation of a trade secret, unfair competition, or 
breach of employment agreements might remedy some of those problems, the clarity and 
simplicity of the copyright action, the ready availability of federal jurisdiction, and the 
statutory remedies combine to make it a significant tool in policing such conduct.
A similar problem occurs for large companies engaged in collaborative 
development projects.  In that context, the copyright protection that attaches during the 
development process is an important part of preserving exclusive rights to the code as it 
passes among the participants in the process.163  Although the participants in that process 
are free to use contracts to define the rights each of them has in the various portions of 
159
 “We have situations all the time during the course of development where our code 
walks out the door.  Or we have rogue employees or contractors who have access to the code who 
leak it.”  Rubin Interview, supra note 157 (transcript at 2); see Beauchamp Interview, supra note 
107 (transcript at 9) (suggesting that copyright’s primary value is as “a protection against possibly 
disgruntled employees or somebody that may have access to the source code”).
160
 The injunctive and criminal remedies discussed above also are important in that 
context.  See Rubin Interview, supra note 157 (transcript at 2); Interview with Derek Witte, 
General Counsel, Silicon Valley Bank (Feb. 6, 2003, Santa Clara, CA) [hereinafter Witte 
Interview] [transcript on file with author] (transcript at 5).
161 See Witte Interview, supra note 160 (transcript at 5):
[T]he way that really happens is when an employee moves from one person to another person, and 
takes the code with them.  The thing that you are most worried about is hiring somebody as an 
engineer to build code, and who in the interest of moving from Point A to Point B in the most 
efficient way just borrows some of what they had from their last employer.  * * * * I worry a little 
bit about somebody taking out, but if you think about it, if somebody leaves my company and goes 
to join Microsoft and stuff finds its way into Microsoft – I’ve won the lottery!
162
 One venture capitalist explained:
The only time there is a concern [about copyright] is if you have a team that has come out of 
another environment, like Sun, we’re concerned about having a free working environment up 
front.  If we thought it was encumbered in some way up front, it would be a problem. * * * * 
It is fairly frequent that we’re asking the question: Is there any code at all from your old 
employer that is in this.  And frankly it is always in the way and there is never a clean way of 
doing due diligence in this other than getting to trust the people not to have walked off with some 
of this.
Gauer Interview, supra note 77 (transcript at 1).
163 See Rubin Interview, supra note 157 (transcript at 1).
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the project, the lawyers that participate in that process argue that the injunctive remedies 
and statutory damages available under the Copyright Act play an important role in 
establishing a robust enforcement backdrop for those arrangements.164  As one executive 
explained, “[t]he protection of [a major new product], as it is being designed, and built, 
and tested, and being distributed to third parties, is critical.  And anything that diminishes 
the protection of that pre-release code will impede our ability and willingness to get 
outsiders to look at the code and test that.”165
V.  The Role of Patents
This part is the core of the paper.  It relies on evidence from the interviews to 
discuss as precisely as possible how patents contribute to the ability of a software startup 
to obtain financing.  It falls into three sections: the limited value of patents for startups, 
the increasing value for firms as they move beyond the startup stage, and the policy 
implications of those findings.
A.  The Limited Value of Patents for Startups
The first point is the strongest one: what patents do not do.  Specifically, patents 
are not often useful in helping the early-stage software company demonstrate the 
sustainable differentiation from its competition that is the focus of the venture investor.166
There are several explanations for that point.  Some of the problems arise from general 
difficulties in obtaining software patents that actually have value, difficulties that afflict 
firms of all sizes.  I will say more about those problems below when I discuss the role of 
patents for growing firms, but it seems important to introduce those problems here.  
Generally, the interview subjects argued that in most cases a competitor could implement 
most of the aspects of a software product that a patent might protect without infringing 
the patent.167 That assertion illustrates the poor match between patents and products in 
the industry: it is difficult to patent an entire product in the software industry, because 
164 See Rubin Interview, supra note 157 (transcript at 1-2) (discussing Copyright Act §§ 
502, 504).
165
 Rubin Interview, supra note 157 (transcript at 2).
166
 I provide some quantitative support for that assertion in the companion paper with 
Tom Sager.  The data analyzed in that paper indicates – with the limited exception of startup 
software firms that have been spun off from larger firms along with a patent portfolio – that very 
few software startups have patents when they receive early funding, and also that only a small 
portion of the firms that ultimately receive patents had even applied for those patents before they 
received their initial funding.
167 See Beauchamp Interview:4 (discussing ease of working around software patents); 
Harding Interview:1 (“There are a lot of ways to work around patents.”); E. Jones Interview:2 
(“[I]n software it is so easy to change things that it is so easy to do the same function, but do it in 
a different way.”); Van Arsdale Interview:3 (“Most patents you can get around.  * * * * There’s 
always a way to do it different.  Some times you have to spend as much money as the patent 
holder spent, but that doesn’t mean you can’t.”).
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any particular product is likely to include dozens if not hundreds of separate 
technological ideas.  Thus, it may take a large number of novel ideas – and patents – to 
build a defensible barrier around a product in the software industry.  A biotech startup, by 
contrast, more often might build a defensible barrier around its product with one patent or 
only a few patents on the relevant composition or process. Another problem is that 
software technology tends to develop so rapidly that by the time a patent is issued – and 
the formal right to exclusivity commences – the technology may be obsolete for all but 
the broadest patents.168  Litigation at that point will involve efforts by the patentholder to 
use the patent to challenge technology of a subsequent generation where the application 
of the patent may be less clear.169
Those problems, however, are not necessarily any more of an obstacle to small 
firms than they are to large firms.  There are some problems, however, that make it 
particularly difficult for early-stage companies to employ patents effectively.  For 
example, even if an early-stage company had a patent, it is most unlikely that it would be 
an appropriate use of its resources to commence litigation to enforce a patent against a 
competitor.170  That is particularly true when the competitor is a large firm:
Most business people I know, particularly in young companies, the last thing they 
want to get involved in is a lawsuit.  You run into that a lot where big companies 
will come in and work around your patent and just dare you to sue them.  “We 
will rain lawyers on your head and tie you up in court for the next ten years.”  * * 
* *
In the venture world, very seldom do disputes get down to the lawsuit stage, 
because nobody wants to spend the time and these young companies can’t afford 
to go through all that.  You think about it, most of the lawsuits seem to happen 
among the big companies who have teams of lawyers and can afford to go at 
each other.171
168 See Rightmer Interview:1 (“The technology moves so fast and the Patent Office 
moves so slow.”); Weghorst Interview:4-5 (explaining that the exclusivity period of the patent is 
“out of sync” with the timing of the value of the innovation).
169 See Cohen & Lemley (2001).
170 See Gill Interview:1 (emphasizing that the cost of enforcement is more of a barrier 
than the cost of obtaining the patent); Harding Interview:1 (“We just don’t have a large enough 
war chest at this point in our life cycle.  Down the road we might be more aggressive once we 
have enough cash to do it.”).
171
 Murphree Interview:1; see Abbott Interview:5 (discussing resource constraints on 
early-stage patent enforcement); Adams Interview:1 (“The ability to defend your patents is only 
as big as your bank account.  And nobody wants to pump money in to do that before you have 
money to fund that from operating income. * * * * [I]f your only hope to make the company work 
is to go to court and win nobody is going to invest.”); Beauchamp Interview:5 (“[A]s a start-up, 
it’s unlikely that we are going to leverage [our] patents in any kind of lawsuit.”); Weghorst 
Interview:5 (explaining that a patent would have little value for an early-stage startup because 
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A somewhat different concern about suing a large firm – related to the discussion 
of patent thickets below – is the likelihood that the large firm might have a patent that the 
small firm infringes.  If so, the lawsuit might simply alert the large firm to the presence of 
the small firm.  As one developer said: “IBM probably could sue us on 20 patents if they 
looked hard at what we do.  But we don’t want to have that relationship with them.  Legal 
fees aside, we could lose everything.”172
An important aspect of that point is the sense that there is something about firm 
culture that is degraded when a firm sinks to the level of relying on licensing revenues 
instead of developing its own product.  As one experienced executive put it:
I think a lot of companies made a mistake and lost their way and did that – Texas 
Instruments, Xerox, National Semiconductor.  Those companies are making more 
money from licensing than from their business.  Engineers don’t go to work to do 
that.  They want to make a better product or service.  As soon as Xerox, 
Nat[ional] Semi[conductor], and TI and those guys started being really 
aggressive about patent licensing, that was the beginning of the end.173
Interestingly enough, that sentiment was expressed even at the two software firms that I 
interviewed that rely heavily on licensing revenues (neither of which, as it happens, are 
startups).  Those firms emphasized efforts to maintain a product-centered culture 
emphasizing production of the firm’s own products.174 One explained the cultural risk as 
follows:
You don’t need sales people; you need attorneys.  You don’t need solutions 
architects; you need accountants.  So you wind up losing the very people who 
are, who were, and who continue to be constructive * * * and innovative and help 
you build things and would give us a continuing competitive advantage.175
competitors would doubt his will and ability to enforce it).  This point is not new, of course.  
Cohen et al. report a similar finding in their cross-industry surveys.  Cohen et al. (2000):14-16.
172
 Rightmer Interview:1.  Thus, to that executive at least, it surely came as no surprise 
when IBM responded in the summer of 2003 to SCO’s noted lawsuit regarding Linux with a 
counterclaim alleging that SCO’s software infringes a number of IBM’s patents.  See, e.g., 
Stephen Shankland, Big Blue Files Counterclaims Against SCO (Aug. 7, 2003), available at 
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5060965.html.  For a similar perspective, see VON HIPPEL 
(1988):53 (discussion of responding to a charge of infringement in the semiconductor industry by 
mailing back to the complainant “’a pound or two’ of its possible germane patents”).
173
 Van Arsdale Interview:2.  In response to a question, he emphasized that IBM is not a 
counter-example to that reasoning: “If they are in a market they want to compete like the rest of 
us.  They just happen to have a huge asset to go and enforce patents – as do we – and it gives you 
a huge asset to go and trade with other companies that are of a like mind.”  Id.
174
 Kalinoski Interview 2:4; Thomas Interview 2:3.
175
 Thomas Interview:3.
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Indeed, at the one firm that had a major licensing program, the entire licensing program 
was entrusted to off-site third-party professionals, so that it would not interfere with the 
focus of the on-site software engineers.176
Thus, as suggested above, many of my interview subjects insisted that the venture 
investor is likely to focus on other concerns related to the company and the sector in 
which it operates or proposes to operate.  Indeed, many investors (and developers) 
emphasized that a focus on patents in fact can be damaging to the startup, because it has 
the potential to divert limited time and resources from what is likely to be a highly time-
pressured effort to develop a product and convince customers and investors of its worth 
before the firm runs out of capital resources.177  One investor explained:  “[We] typically 
find that the companies that focus on just patents don’t have the right view of what is 
important, and they really are therefore not successful in business.  And they’re usually 
not around to prosecute their patents.”178  Developers understand the point well.  As one 
said: “Every dollar we spend on [patenting] is a dollar we can’t spend on a software 
engineer.”179  Another, with a patent-leaning background from his days at IBM 
commented: “Patentability is something we will pursue, but let’s get the product out 
first.”180
This presents the young company with a challenging task.  If the nature of the 
firm’s innovation is such that IP is ever likely to be important, it must spend sufficient 
resources on the protection and development of intellectual property from the earliest 
days of the company – as an investment in the future possibility that the firm might at 
some point grow to the point where the IP is useful.181  The firm that fails to protect its IP 
at the earliest stage is like a desperate ship at sea that empties its water in the hope of 
evading a faster pursuer: it might survive for the time being, but it may have sown the 
176
 Thomas Interview:4.
177 See Denniston Interview:1 (“For Series-A firms, there just isn’t the budget for 
patenting.”); E. Jones Interview:3 (“It was better to spend the time continuing to advance the 
technology than it was to push people off to the side and have them focus on creating the patents 
and work on it.”); Kielb Interview:1 (the cost of diverting the “time, attention, energy, and focus” 
of personnel to a “suboptimal” use is more important than the monetary cost of obtaining a 
patent); Treybig Interview:6 (“If you’re a small company, and unless you have a hell of a patent, 
it’s pretty hard to spend money on patents versus another salesman or something.”).
178
 Subhedar Interview:4.
179
 Harding Interview:1; see Bishop Interview:2 (former IBM executive now leading 
startup explaining shift in philosophy among investors so that now “there is a lot more interest in 
getting the product out than in having patents”); Rightmer Interview:1 (discussing costs of 
documentation necessary to protect the ability to obtain patent’s on the firm’s innovation).
180
 Bishop Interview:2.
181 See Gill Interview:1 (explaining that the strategy is to obtain patents early “knowing 
that you won’t enforce them until later”).
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seeds of its inevitable failure if it survives to a later stage.182  On the other hand, it must 
not spend so many resources that the company fails before it reaches the point where that 
investment can be recouped.
Firms have developed a number of strategies to deal with that difficult problem.  
Some involve using half-measures to protect the IP, such as filing provisional 
applications,183 or omitting standard practices related to documentation of the work of 
engineers.184  Those kinds of practices do not directly abandon the IP, but they may make 
it more costly and difficult to protect it in the future.  The bottom line is that even for 
companies that have grown to the point where they have substantial revenues it often 
does not seem appropriate to devote the resources necessary to ensure that all of the 
firm’s innovations are patented.185  Others – it must be said that executives with prior 
experience at large IP-sensitive firms like IBM186 or Bell Labs populate this category –
seem to relish the discipline of making sure that the IP is pinned down no matter how 
difficult it may seem to find the time and resources to do so.187  If anything is clear, it is 
that the difficulty of this strategic choice, coupled with the difficulty in accurately 
predicting the future prospects for their products and their IP, doubtless leads to many of 
the failures in the industry.188
182
 The metaphor will be plain to readers of Patrick O’Brian.
183 See Beauchamp Interview:3- 4 (discussing use of provisional applications); Weghorst 
Interview:4 (same).
184 See Weghorst Interview:6 (discussing deferral of documentation of inventions to limit 
up-front costs of IP protection).  The costs of a vigorous pursuit of that process are considerable.  
One executive with experience at IBM and elsewhere suggested that as a rule of thumb he 
commits 4-8 engineer hours per week for the life of the application, examining, and issuance 
process.  See Bishop Interview:2.
185
 Sikora Interview:1 (“Software companies are not 3M.  We don’t organize our offices 
to get patents.”).
186
 IBM’s dominant patent portfolio is not an accident.  It plainly has one of the most – if 
not the most – patent intensive environments among American companies.  See Dinkin 
Interview:3-5.  IBM has been the leading U.S. patentee every year since 1993, and IBM also
appears to be the leading software patentee.  Manny Schecter, IBM’s Strategies for the Creation, 
Protection and Use of Intellectual Property in Software (Nov. 30, 2001), available at 
http://emertech.wharton.upenn.edu/ConfRpts_Folder/WhartonKnowledgeAssets_Report.pdf.
187 See Kalinoski Interview:2-4 (former IBM engineer leading startup company; 
describing comprehensive incentive program designed to emphasize the importance of patenting 
to engineering team).
188 See Abbott Interview:5 (explaining that the decision has to be made “looking at the 
amount of time, dollars, and effort required that potentially could pay off huge in a couple of 
years”); Kalinoski Interview:6 (discussing that choice and emphasizing that patents can be 
thoroughly protected only through a conscious commitment: “You have to make a conscious 
decision – either you’re gonna do it, or you’re not gonna do it.”): Thomas Interview:1 (“[I]t’s a 
mindset issue.”).
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Investors, of course, are aware of this problem.  Their approach typically does not 
extend to forcing (or even urging) their portfolio companies to seek patent protection.  
However, they do go to considerable lengths to evaluate the IP that potential portfolio 
companies have.  In a typical process, the investor will know most of the reputable patent 
attorneys in the local community.  If one of those attorneys had filed a patent, the VC 
would discuss the patent with that lawyer.  If an attorney with whom the VC did not have 
a preexisting relationship filed the patent application, the VC would have the patent 
studied by an attorney in whom it had confidence.  In context, it was clear that the intent 
of the examination was not purely technical – is this a patent likely to be granted – but 
also a broader exercise to understand what type of market power the patent might (or 
might not) provide.189  In short, standard industry practice now views examination of that 
market power as central to careful due-diligence practices.190  That practice at first seems 
to be in tension with the thesis of this section – that patents have little value for the 
earliest-stage startups.  In fact, however, it leads into the point of the next section, that the 
firms that survive their earliest days may reap substantial value from patents.
B.  The Increasing Value of Patents for Growing Firms
As the discussion above suggests, it seems plain that patents are valuable to 
software firms at some stage in their development, even if it is not at the earliest stage, 
when the firm is still struggling to develop its first product.  This section examines that 
question, illustrating how patents are valuable to software firms while they are still quite 
small, as they proceed through the stages of the venture-capital process.191  To structure 
the discussion, I start with the quantitative evidence presented in detail in the companion 
paper.192  That evidence shows two things of relevance to this discussion.  First, even 
controlling for industry group and location, the number of rounds of financing that a firm 
receives is related at the 5% level to whether the firm has a patent.  Similarly, the final 
status of the firm (acquired, defunct, existing, public) is related to the number and 
existence of patents at the 1% level.  Those findings suggest that patents matter in some 
way.  At the same time, the explanatory power of those findings is quite small – the 
adjusted R-squared values range from 0.5% to 1.3% in the various formulations of the 
test.  That suggests that whatever the value is, it is not the leading indicator of the firm’s 
189 See Lee Interview:1: Murphree Interview:1 (emphasizing interest in how “defensible” 
the market position is); Stephenson Interview:2.
190 See Fine & Palmer (in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS) (discussing modern due-diligence 
practice for IP assets); Haller et al. (in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS) (same).
191 See Gauer Interview:1-2 (“I’ve never invested in a software company that had a patent 
when I invested in it.  I have had companies that were working on patents that four years later 
became patents.”); Lee Interview:1 (indicating no concern about the existence of patents at the 
“seed” or “A” stage, but considerable interest in them for firms farther along). Again, this finding
is consistent with the results of the Cohen et al. cross-industry surveys, which reported a 
significant correlation between firm size and the effectiveness of patents in appropriating the 
value of innovation.  Cohen et al. (2000):12.
192
 Mann & Sager (2004).
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success, but at best an episodic or indirect factor.  That builds on the discussion in the 
previous section, indicating the consistent perspective that IP is of at best secondary 
importance.193
1.  Direct Effects: Protecting a Space for Innovation
The most important point concerns the direct ability of the software patent to 
carve out for the firm a space in which it can innovate without competition.  As discussed 
above, it is common in the software industry to report that software patents are used 
defensively, rather than offensively.194  In conversation, this assertion tends to be coupled 
with the problem that software patents tend to be relatively weak devices for 
appropriating the value of a software-related invention.195  Although there is some truth 
in both of those points, they are gross overgeneralizations, at least once a firm reaches the 
stage at which it has designed a product that it can market to customers.
To respond directly to the first point, it is clear that some firms in the industry 
obtain a substantial amount of revenues by licensing the use of their patents to 
competitors that need to use the patented technology in their own products.  Indeed, even 
in my limited interview sample three small companies – Applied Science Fiction,196
Bluecurrent,197 and Forgent198 – have obtained substantial revenues in that way.  I have 
not located industry-wide statistics that quantify the size of that market, but it plainly is 
substantial.  Those transactions – and others like them – demonstrate that some software 
patents are sufficiently robust to allow their holders to appropriate substantial value from 
the underlying inventions.  Those transactions seem to me particularly noteworthy given 
the difficulties those firms face in enforcing patents against large firms with their own 
patent portfolios.  As discussed above,199 the small firm with a revenue-producing 
product must be quite confident in the value of its technology before it wisely can cross 
swords with a company like IBM.
193 See Kielb Interview:1 (even in areas in which patents are useful, “it is the ability to 
build something that is usable and solves a problem that produces 80% of the value”).
194 See supra notes 170-176 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
196
 Urdahl Interview.  Details regarding the amount of revenues do not appear to be 
public.  For press releases announcing licensing transactions, see, e.g., 
http://www.asf.com/events/press/092402_Konica_RS1.shtml, 
http://www.asf.com/events/press/Gretag.shtml, and 
http://www.asf.com/events/press/DurstSigma.shtml.  Applied Science Fiction now has been 
acquired by Kodak.  www.asf.com. 
197
 Thomas Interview; http://online.wsj.com/article_email/0,,SB106677936791434300-
H9jeoNjlaR2nZyqZnqHcaeHm4,00.html. 
198
 Forgent’s patent on the .jpeg file format has produced tens of millions of dollars in 
revenues.  http://www.forgent.com/company/press_room/dallas_082802.shtml. 
199 See supra note 172.
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More generally, it seems clear that the received wisdom that patents are not useful 
to appropriate software-related inventions is quite overstated.  Two separate points are 
important.  The first point is the distinction between the relative rarity of observed 
offensive use of patents – for out-licensing or litigation – and the use of patents to 
exclude competitors.  The relative rarity of offensive use of patents does not prove that 
the patents are not sufficiently robust to exclude competitors.  As discussed in the 
previous section, there are many good reasons why a firm might want to wait until quite 
late in its development before it advertises the nature of its technology and its proprietary 
claims to that technology.
A firm can refrain from offensive use of its patents and still derive important 
value from the patents as a device to exclude competitors.  Contrary to the general 
perception that patents tilt the playing field in favor of large incumbent firms to the 
disadvantage of small firms,200 patents in this context afford a unique opportunity to the 
small startup.  It is as if the patent system grants the small firm an automatic stay of 
competitive activity, to remain in force long enough for the firm to attempt to develop its 
technology.  For large firms, the marginal increase in appropriability that comes from 
patents may have little benefit: IBM could compete quite successfully against smaller 
firms even if it did not have patents protecting its product from copying competitors.201
For the smaller firm, however, the ability to prevent incumbents like IBM and Microsoft 
from taking its technology can be the difference between life and death. As one executive 
put it: “What’s protected me from other people ripping [off our product] has been the 
specter of patent infringement.”202
On that point, it is instructive to think of the most salient uses of software patents.  
The most famous successful uses of software patents are plainly not use by giants to 
stamp out incipient competition.  On the contrary, the most famous incidents are 
successful attempts by small firms (Stax in the mid-1990’s and Eolas in 2003) to force 
alterations in Microsoft products that arguably infringed patents held by relatively tiny 
firms, and a similar attempt by InterTrust to assert rights to digital rights management 
technology important to a variety of Microsoft products.203  The general point is 
consistent with recent empirical work suggesting that patents held by small firms are 
more likely to be litigated than patents held by large firms.204
200 I discuss that perception in detail in subpart VI(C).
201
 That is not to say that patents are not valuable to IBM.  As discussed below, IBM 
derives substantial revenues from its software patent portfolio.  I do argue, however, that patents 
play completely different roles for small venture-backed firms and for incumbent dominant firms 
like IBM and Microsoft.
202
 Thomas Interview:2.  For a general analysis of that point, see Barnett (2003).
203
 For discussion of the InterTrust litigation, see 
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/print/0,15935,400412,00.html.  The recent victory by 
MercExchange over eBay surely deserves honorable mention.
204
 Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey (2003).
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The second point is that the ability of a patent to appropriate the value of an 
invention will vary along a number of dimensions.  One of the most commonly 
mentioned dimensions in my interviews relates to the nature of the particular innovation.  
Thus, it generally is regarded as bordering on futile to rely on a patent in which the 
innovation lies in a method of writing software code.205  At the other end of the 
continuum, patents that protect an ultimate functionality that the software provides or an 
algorithm necessary to provide that functionality are more likely to be important in 
excluding potential competitors.206 Interestingly, that distinction seems to cut in the 
opposite direction of the conventional wisdom that “process” patents tend to be less 
valuable than “product” patents.207 In the software industry, a patent on the particular 
product tends to have relatively little value because of the ease of designing a distinct 
product.  A patent on the process that the product implements is much more likely to be 
valuable, if only because it often is possible for the claimed process to be defined broadly 
enough to include all practical methods of competition.208
Loosely related to that continuum is a variation from sector to sector.  As the 
empirical data presented in the companion paper with Tom Sager demonstrates, there is a 
strong variation in the rate of patenting among the different sectors of the software 
industry.  For example, the average number of patents in the whole sample was about 0.7 
patents per firm.  Several sectors, however, had markedly higher rates: 4.9 per firm in 
graphics and digital imaging,209 2.7 per firm in the small sectors of expert systems and 
natural language, 1.6 per firm in multimedia, and 1.0 per firm in the security sector.  At 
the same time, some relatively important sectors had unusually low rates of patenting: no 
205 See Denniston Interview:1 (“Is there value in patenting lines of code?  Almost 
never.”).
206 See Crouse Interview:1 (discussing range of patent significance at different sectors of 
Microsoft’s operations); D’Eath Interview:5 (contending that his firm’s patents create a 
“competitive barrier,” albeit not one of sufficient significance that it would interest investors); 
Eggleston Interview:2-3 (emphasizing the importance of patents to his company’s development, 
but acknowledging that they are less important for most software companies); Jackson Interview 
4 (“If you can get that kind of a business methods patent or a kind of overall process patent for 
doing things in a certain way, I would say that that’s quite important because of your ability to 
exclude others. * * * * Not having a patent doesn’t mean you can’t build a business, but having a 
patent, in my view, certainly strengthens your position.”).  The perspective of the biotech 
executive that I interviewed was starkly different (as the data would suggest): “Intellectual 
property in our industry is the number one reason people fund you or don’t fund you.”  O’Connor 
Interview:1.
207 See Cohen et al. (2000):10 (empirical finding based on cross-industry surveys that 
process patents are significantly less valuable than product patents).  For a different 
categorization of software innovation, see Gruner (2000):984-87 (three categories of 
conceptualization, coding, and external links).
208
 Thomas Interview:2; Urdahl, Hill, Witek Interviews.
209
 That includes the 62 patents held by Flashpoint, the highest patenter in our dataset.  
Even excluding Flashpoint, there were about 1.35 patents per firm in that sector.
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patents at all for the 25 firms in the email and internet software sectors, .03 in 
applications software, and .12 in software for financial institutions.210  That variation is 
quite startling, because it is quantitatively discernible even though patents are thought to 
be less valuable for software generally than they are for hardware,211 and even though 
patents are much less common in the software industry as a whole than in some other 
industries (biotech being the most commonly noted example).212  It seems likely that the 
variation is related at least in part to the nature of innovation in the different sectors, with 
higher rates of patenting associated with types of innovation more susceptible of 
appropriation by patent and lower rates of patenting associated with types of innovation 
less susceptible of appropriation by patent.
Taken together, those two points portray a world in which small firms struggle to 
innovate, facing the pervasive concern that a competitor might appropriate any useful 
invention at any time.  Given the difficulties that the previous parts summarize in 
sustaining differentiation from competitors, the likelihood that patents can provide shelter 
for some firms is an important one.  The shelter may be difficult to predict – because it 
must depend for the most part on the breadth of market protection a patent turns out to 
have by the time it is issued, something that is quite difficult to predict when the patent 
application is filed.213 The interviews that I discuss above, however, suggest that it is real 
in the place where its effect would be most important, in the minds of the firms doing the 
innovation.  It is difficult to believe that this is not a part of what makes patents and their 
breadth an item of interest to investors.
2.  Indirect Effects: Facilitating Investment
The previous section argues that the most important structural significance of 
patents with respect to small firms is that they have the potential to protect a successful 
product from appropriation by an incumbent competitor.  It is clear from the interviews, 
210
 The variance in the number of patents each firm has, and in the likelihood that a firm 
will have any patents, is significant at the 1% level.
211
 For similar sentiments, see Bishop Interview:2 (endorsing the view that software 
patents generally are easier to work around than hardware patents, particularly when they are 
method patents: “Software is so malleable that it is easy to exploit the idea.”); E. Jones 
Interview:1 (explaining that patents on software are generally less useful than patents on 
hardware); Kielb Interview:1 (emphasizing the range in utility of patents among industries, with 
software generally at the low end); Treybig Interview:2 (suggesting that hardware patents have 
more potential to exclude competitors than software patents).  For a contrasting view, see Dinkin 
Interview:12-13 (arguing that the difference in valuation of patents relates to the relative youth of 
the software industry); Treybig Interview:6 (suggesting that when the industry matures software 
patents and hardware patents will have similar values).
212
 The companion paper with Tom Sager shows that only about 20% of venture-backed 
software firms have patents, while about 50% of venture-backed biotech firms.  It also shows 
statistically significant variations in the likelihood of patenting among the different sectors of the 
software industry.
213
 Dinkin Interview
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however, that patents have a number of more subtle and less direct effects on the flow of 
investment and acquisition dollars into the growing software firm.  This section organizes 
those indirect effects under the four separate headings that follow.
(a) Barter for Cross-Licensing
The most prominent explanation is that patents will be useful as “barter” in cross-
licensing agreements that the firm would enter into if it reached a sufficiently mature 
stage to be a significant player in the industry.  The interview subjects with whom I 
discussed the subject articulated a common vision of the way that firms gain access to 
protected technology in the industry: they obtain a cross-license from existing industry 
members that have patents that relate to their technology.  To the extent that a rising firm 
has patents on its own technology, it can reduce the cost of licensing technology from 
existing market players by providing that technology as part of a cross-license 
agreement.214  The likelihood that the firm will be called upon at some point in time to 
enter such an agreement seems to be quite high.  Interview subjects acknowledged, for 
example, that their products might infringe a patent in IBM’s large portfolio of software 
patents.215  Nevertheless, a patent to offset IBM’s potential claim is of little value until 
the day when IBM demands royalties.  IBM typically does not ask for royalties until the 
firm is earning sufficient revenues to justify the inquiry.216
214 See Abbott Interview:5 (offering IBM as the example of a potential cross-license 
partner); Crouse Interview:1-2 (discussing value to Microsoft of building a patent portfolio for 
defensive purposes); Gauer Interview:2 (“The patent comes in as a defensive mechanism down 
the road in the event that we stumble upon something else that we’ve infringed on so that we have 
our arsenal in order and can use it in a cross-license arrangement or the like.”); Kalinoski 
Interview:5 (describing use of patent to offset request from IBM to pay royalties); Rightmer 
Interview:1; Subhedar Interview:2 (“You can usually trade, you can usually cross-license if you 
have patents, so as the company grows bigger, there is value to patent portfolios.”); Treybig 
Interview:1(“Patents may give them protection against the bigger company’s patent portfolio. I 
mean, IBM has a room full of patents and it’s huge, to the wall, ceiling, and on and on, so, it’s 
somewhat protection against the bigger companies if they have to come after them.”); Witte 
Interview:1 (“And a classic case is IBM will show up and say, “I have this huge portfolio and you 
must infringe some of mine because I have so many.”  And then, of course, what you hope is that 
you have been careful and selected some strategic technology to patent that they may infringe[, so 
that you can] use that as a shield.”).
215
 Rightmer Interview:1 (“IBM probably could sue us on 20 patents if they looked hard 
at what we do.”).
216 See Abbott Interview:6 (suggesting that IBM only pursues companies “with a certain 
revenue baseline” and the need to get a patent “before you get on that radar”); Gauer Interview:3 
(“A lot of times the company is IBM or somebody big like that.  At what point are they going to 
come after us?  Most of the time the answer is that we’re too small to bother with, but we have to 
have a strategy for how to deal with them when it comes up – what might we have to trade them 
for license rights when we get bigger.”); Treybig Interview:2-3 (discussing value of a patent for 
cross-licensing once you get on IBM’s “scope”).
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(b) Signaling
The second benefit of patenting is a “signaling” effect.217  Some say that patents 
provide a “signal” of engineering discipline and market understanding.  The premise of 
that argument is that firms that get patents tend to be more careful in their engineering 
work and to understand what is special about their products better than competitors that 
do not have patents.  For example, one serial startup developer explained:
[I]n my experience, all a software patent buys you is the fact that you are 
disciplined in your engineering approach and that it is reflected in your ability to 
execute technically. Not that it is a means of protection for the investors to 
believe that you’re gonna be the only person that’s gonna be able to solve this 
particular problem.218
Those that articulate this line of reasoning generally view the signal as a true one 
– a plausible indicator of valuable information about the firm that otherwise would be 
difficult to discern.219  Notice, of course, that this use of patents says absolutely nothing 
about the actual uniqueness of the technology or the ability of the firm to exclude 
competitors.  Rather, it reflects something positive about the ability of the management 
team to focus and execute.  That does not mean, however, that the signal is not taken 
seriously.  As discussed in Part IV, many investors think that inadequate market analysis 
For a good example from the hardware industry, one of my interview subjects discusses 
the early history of Dell, upon which IBM called seeking royalties shortly after the distribution of 
an early Dell product.  Although those royalties were a “significant hit” to the bottom line, Dell 
quickly obtained a few patents of its own, which it used to alter the terms of its arrangement to 
one in which neither side pays royalties.  Inman Interview:1.
I discuss in subpart VI(C) reasons why it is unlikely to be fatal to the firm if it does not 
have patents to cross-license.  It suffices for the present discussion to illustrate why a patent 
would be a valuable thing to have in potential cross-licensing discussions.
217 See generally Long (2002) (discussing circumstances in which patents can provide 
valuable signals).
218
 Beauchamp Interview:4.
219
 Gauer Interview:2 (“The fact that they were working on something that might be 
patentable does tend to be tied with them working on new problems and suggests that they are up 
on the leading edge of people tackling the kind of problems in which we’d like to invest.  The 
patent itself, however, isn’t the point.  * * * * The fact that people may have patentable work 
tends to correlate with working in new areas and being world-class in those areas but I would 
never make an investment decision based on whether there is a patent or not or whether I thought 
a patent application would be successful.”); Treybig Interview:1 (“[P]atents give you some idea 
of ‘are these smart people I’m dealing with, that want to start this company’?”).
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and execution are among the most common reasons for the failure of startup 
companies.220  A signal that suggests something positive on that score is a useful one.
(c) Facilitating the Codification of Knowledge
Although it was not raised in any of my interviews, I discern considerable merit in 
a closely related role of the patent that is apparent from Ashish Arora’s recent writings on 
innovation.  He argues that one of the key problems in transferring knowledge from one 
firm to another is the ability to convert tacit knowledge – which is difficult to verify or 
transfer – to codified knowledge, which readily can be evaluated and transferred to third 
parties.221  Because a patent by definition – at least if it satisfies the statutory criteria –
includes the knowledge necessary to allow a person knowledgeable in the relevant art to 
replicate the invention, the existence of a patent is strong evidence both that there in fact 
is substantial knowledge of some kind and that the knowledge is not so bound up with the 
abilities of particular individuals as to be immovable.
(d) Facilitating Acquisitions
The last commonly proffered benefit of patents relates to acquisitions.  As 
discussed below, larger firms are likely to value patents for reasons quite different from 
those that motivate small firms: because they facilitate freedom of action by helping the 
larger company avoid claims of infringement.222 Thus, investors consider the existence 
of a patent to play a key role in influencing the “build-or-buy” decision of a larger 
company: the hope is that the potential cost of patent infringement will make it cheaper 
for the larger company to purchase the portfolio company rather than build the 
technology in-house.223  Even there, however, it is clear that the sophisticated acquirer 
220
 The focus on the importance of execution is exemplified by the current New York 
Times bestseller RAM CHARAN, EXECUTION: THE DISCIPLINE OF GETTING THINGS DONE (2002), 
a fixture on the desks of startup executives that I have interviewed.
221 ARORA ET AL. (2001):95-99.
222
 Claims of infringement might be more of a concern for a large firm because their 
revenue base is so much larger that even a low-percentage royalty claim could cause significant 
damages.  The recent Eolas case against Microsoft is a textbook example.  Eolas received a $500 
million verdict for technology that affects, at most, a tiny portion of Windows Explorer.  One 
report calculated that the dispute involved only 305 of the 56 million lines of code in Windows, 
but the plaintiff still received a royalty of $1.47 for each copy of Windows.  Viewed on a pro rate 
basis, that would suggest a value per copy of Windows of about $500,000.  
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2003/09/22/few_celebrate_this_defeat_for_micro
soft/.  It is worth noting that the technology in question was invented at the University of 
California.  The patent was licensed to Eolas, but the University of California will receive 25% of 
the proceeds from the litigation.  http://news.com.com/2100-1012-5062409.html. 
223 See Beauchamp Interview:5 (“It is a tangible asset that during an acquisition, the 
investors can hold up to make the argument that they can increase the valuation of the 
company.”); Lee Interview:2.  That perspective appears to be justified – to some limited extent –
by the attitudes of people at potential acquirers.  See Crouse Interview:2 (discussing importance 
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will focus on the business proposition that the company offers to its customers and 
whether that business proposition makes sense apart from the IP that might protect the 
ability to deliver that proposition.224  For example, consider the following comments 
about Google (a firm that, incidentally, has two patents):
Do you think the big asset for Google is patents?  No, it’s a business model that’s 
working and making money.  Do you think patents are something they’re not 
being stupid about.  They’re filing patents and being careful on the off fear that 
Microsoft might sue them.  Do you think they’ve built into their S-1 or their 
business plan that they plan on using their patent portfolio directly?  No way.225
That same explanation can be spun in a much more negative way if it is thought 
that the patents will not ultimately bring any value to the balance sheet of the acquiring 
firm.  This take on the role of patents in acquisition characterizes them as valuable for 
“marketing,”226 convincing the investors in public markets that the company’s technology 
is valuable.227  The idea here is that sophisticated investors at the early stage can evaluate 
the “true” value of the technology based on a careful analysis of such factors as the 
company’s product, customer’s needs for that product, and the personnel that the 
company employs to execute its business plan.  Thus, the patent has only secondary 
significance to those investors.  Customers or later-stage investors, by contrast, are said to 
be less willing to undertake such careful evaluations.228  Thus, the argument goes, they 
tend to rely (less thoughtfully) on the mere existence of patents in the company’s 
portfolio.229  That argument is made particularly with respect to protecting the downside 
of patents in Microsoft acquisitions); Van Arsdale Interview:1 (same); see Witte Interview:4 
(suggesting that a typical patent would be “asset number 31” in the list of important assets being 
acquired).
224 See Van Arsdale Interview:2-3.
225
 Van Arsdale Interview:3.
226
 In contrast to the “signal” that the patent provides to the sophisticated investor, the 
value of the patent from this negative perspective is characterized as “optical”: something that 
enhances the appearance of the company but does nothing for the underlying economics or 
prospects of the firm.  See Abbott Interview:5.  Bartow (2000):8-9 makes this point vigorously.
227 See Weghorst Interview:5 (discussing “marketing leverage” with investors).
228
 One developer offered the following description of his firm’s patent:
It was useful, not in the traditional sense.  I don’t think it could ever be sold by 
itself for something.  But it allowed us to position ourselves as having a unique 
capability.  We designed this for you.  We created this.  We patented it.  We’re the 
only ones.  Was it immensely valuable in the business?  I think it was more 
valuable from a marketing standpoint than anything.
Costello Interview:1; see Abbott Interview:5 (similar perspective).
229 See D’Eath Interview:5 (explaining that his firm’s patents would be important to 
potential “acquisitors” though probably not to venture-capital investors).
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in the event of a company’s failure.230  Interestingly, developers often present a similar 
argument about venture capitalists, arguing that they obtain patents that have no real 
value to them, in part because they will look good to venture capitalists.231  The truth of 
that view in any particular context is of course difficult to assess.
3.  Summary
In sum, the interviews suggest a highly particularistic and localized set of 
explanations for the value of patents.  Because of the anecdotal and fragmentary nature of 
the information, the discussion is necessarily tentative.  Some obvious avenues for further 
research suggest themselves.  For example, a much better understanding of the claims 
about the significance of litigation and licensing could be obtained by analyzing data 
about those events.  For example, it would be interesting to know something about the 
frequency with which software patents are litigated, the extent to which the litigation is 
offensive or defensive, and the relative size of the parties to the dispute.232  Similarly, 
more detailed evidence about licensing practices would be most instructive about the 
value of patents as barter in licensing: we do not know such basic facts as how often 
firms voluntarily request licensing arrangements; how often licensing arrangements are a 
mechanism for settling claims of infringement; or how much firms pay for the licenses 
they need to operate their businesses.233
Still, even the limited information available here provides a framework for 
understanding the role of patents in small software firms.  At the earliest stage, when a 
firm is trying to define and develop its initial product, the patents may have no current
value.  But that will change quite early in the life of the firm, as the patents begin to have 
a variety of useful attributes around the time the firm begins to market its products.  The 
most important claim is that the patents can play an important role in preventing existing 
incumbents from appropriating the small firm’s products wholesale.  In some cases, 
probably not many, the patents may be so valuable as to produce direct revenues at an 
early stage from licensing to larger existing competitors.  Finally, less significant as a 
230 See Enroth Interview:1 (discussing a “perception that’s around that if you have 
patented something that there’s really got to be some level of perceived value there, so if you’re 
liquidating it there is a different level of ability to get some value out of that compared to 
something that is viewed as not proprietary”); Inman Interview:1 (discussing “residual value” in 
intellectual property that returned some value to investors when startup failed in the market); 
Stephenson Interview:1 (“IP is something that in the downside case we can sell off and make 
something.”).
231 See Abbott Interview:5; Rightmer Interview:1.
232
 I am in the early stages of collecting data for such a project.  Allison, Lemley & 
Moore (2003) provides the best evidence to date on that question.  That project examines the 
characteristics of a large class of litigated patents, which indirectly sheds light on the types of 
parties that bring litigation.  I hope to provide a more focused and party-based examination of 
litigation in the software industry, designed to understand the dynamics of the offensive use of 
patents by small and large software firms.
233
 I see no obvious way to collect reliable data on those issues.
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structural matter, but nevertheless pervasive, are a variety of indirect effects that help 
investors to direct their investments to the firms most likely to succeed.234
C.  Policy Implications
The analysis presented above is incomplete in several obvious ways.  Most 
obviously, it focuses only on the small firms in the industry.  Although the industry is 
young, there are of course a large number of firms that are significantly larger than the 
firms on whom this study focuses.  Still, given the importance of that part of the industry 
to innovation, the analysis does support some tentative understandings about the much-
debated policy questions related to the growth of patents in the industry.
The most important question of course is whether patents are good for the 
industry.  In its broadest form, that is an almost unanswerable question.  For example, it 
is not easy to determine empirically or analytically whether the pace of innovation in any 
particular industry at any particular time is optimal, hyperoptimal, or suboptimal.  Still, 
most scholars have accepted as a working premise that software patents would be good if 
they promoted an increase in innovation and bad if they led to a decline in innovation.  
Moreover, even the narrower question – whether patents lead to more or less innovation –
seems empirically intractable, given the difficulty in determining the relative weights of 
the positive effects (increased incentives to development) and negative effects (the 
potential for decreased access to patented technology).  The question would be even more 
complicated if we took into account broader imperfections in the economy that cause the 
incentives of the individual firms to diverge from optimality.235
Having said that, this paper does provide considerable information that bears on 
those questions directly. First, the discussion in the previous parts makes it possible to 
situate the software industry as it currently exists within the multi-faceted theoretical 
discussion about differing types of innovation.  That discussion suggests a key 
institutional question that drives the net effectiveness of patenting in the software 
industry: have transactional patterns developed that limit the costs of patents by making 
cross-licenses of important technology readily available at reasonable costs?  If they have 
not, then patents probably are a drag on innovation in the industry. Second, even if those 
arrangements exist, are patents sufficiently valuable to those that hold them that they 
attract investment in the industry?  If patents are not sufficiently powerful to alter the 
sectors into which investments in innovation are made, then it is difficult to believe that 
the transactions costs of the system are justified by the benefits.236  Looking at those 
questions, the evidence suggests – albeit tentatively – the likelihood that patents are a 
234
 The idea that patents might be especially useful to small firms ties in well with the 
persistent policy concern that our patent system should be designed in a way that would protect 
small inventors.  Lemley & Chien (2003):1299.
235
 Markovits (1975).
236
 For a powerful demonstration that patents can alter the direction of innovation, see 
Moser (2003) (relying on an extensive dataset from 19th century international exhibitions).
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positive force for innovation in the industry.  Together, as I explain in more detail below, 
those points strongly undercut the facile claims of a stifling patent thicket that have 
received so much attention in the press.  On the contrary, if anything, the principal benefit 
of patents seems to be to shelter small firms against the potential domination of 
incumbent firms.237
1.  Patents and Theories of Innovation
For the last decade, the dominant strain in the rich literature on the effect of 
patents has been that patents work differently in different kinds of industries.  That 
literature has tended to analyze the question in several different ways.  Some scholars 
(most prominently Merges and Nelson in papers written by themselves, with each other, 
or with others) have focused on the question of innovation – analyzing different ways in 
which innovation proceeds in different kinds of industries, and then inquiring whether 
patents seem to foster or retard different kinds of innovation.  Another tack has started 
from the other side of the question, starting from a theory of the effects of patents, and 
then inquiring whether those effects would tend to maximize innovation.  With respect to 
the software industry as it currently exists, both of those approaches suggest the same 
answer: that any possible positive effects of patents are dependent on arrangements that 
make inventions widely available throughout the industry.
Starting with the first method of analysis, Merges and Nelson identify four 
different “industrial patterns of technical advance”: discrete invention, cumulative 
technologies, chemical technologies, and science-based technologies.238  Within that 
framework, it seems plain that software is a “cumulative” technology,239 in which 
“today’s advances build on and interact with many other features of existing 
technology.”240  They offer two major conclusions about innovation in those industries: 
that such industries develop most rapidly when there are multiple and competitive 
sources of invention rather than a single source, and that the adverse effects of strong 
patents or patent portfolios can be mitigated by cross-licensing schemes.241
The second method of analysis considers the purpose of patents.  The seminal 
paper in that literature is Plant’s 1934 paper, which sets out the basic “reward” or 
“invention motivation” theory of patents – that patents might but might not, induce 
innovation by providing monopoly profits to the holder of the patent.242  It is clear that 
237
 Jonathan Barnett argues that this generally is true, largely because of the relatively 
limited ability of small firms to take advantage of other techniques for appropriating the value of 
their inventions.  Barnett (2003).  It is not clear to me, however, that the literature presently 
includes a plausible example of such an outcome in an existing industry.
238 See Merges & Nelson (1990):880; Merges & Nelson (1994):6-8.
239 E.g., Burk & Lemley (2003):82-90; Cohen & Lemley:40-42.
240 See Merges & Nelson (1990):881; FTC Report:44-45.
241 See Merges & Nelson (1990):908.
242 See Plant (1934); Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1033-38.
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this is an important benefit of patents in some industries,243 although the software 
industry in its current form probably is not one of them.244  The other major benefit of 
longstanding notice in the literature – said to be inherent in the bargain reflected in the 
patent statute245 – is the idea that patents enhance innovation by disseminating 
information about inventions.246  The idea is that the disclosure required by the patent 
statute247 enhances the spillover effects of inventions by increasing the likelihood that 
people throughout the industry will learn about the invention rapidly.  Whatever the 
merits of that possibility generally, it is unlikely to have significant relevance to the 
software industry.  As others have noted, the Federal Circuit in software cases has 
interpreted the disclosure requirement in such a way as to minimize the likelihood that 
disclosures will require information that is directly useful to competing inventors.248
Moreover, given the rapid pace of innovation, it will not often be the case that 
243 See Cohen et al. (2000):24.
244
 There is of course the phenomenon of patent holding companies – which have no 
operating products and exist solely to collect licensing revenues for patents that they (typically) 
have purchased from inventors.  See RIVETTE & KLINE (2000):135 et seq.; Dinkin Interview:11; 
Gauer Interview:3 (noting that problem); Sikora Interview:1 (same); Subhedar Interview:2 
(same); Witte Interview:1 (same); see also Burk & Lemley (2003) (characterizing such 
companies as “trolls”).  Although this might change, my perception is that the phenomenon at the 
present is sufficiently small that it does not affect the structure of the industry as a whole.  The 
interview references discussed above leave me with the view that those companies are more in 
the nature of a noisome gadfly than any serious threat to innovation.  Even my interviews at 
Microsoft (the target of most of that litigation) did not reflect any serious concern about that 
phenomenon.
Indeed, those firms seem to me to have the potential to play an important role for patents 
for which commercialization requires extensive capital investments beyond the liquidity of the 
patentee.  Whatever the merits of the dispute, the Eolas litigation with Microsoft illustrates how 
such a firm might be the only way for an inventor (the University of California in that case) to 
obtain the capital that was necessary to ensure that the inventor could obtain a return on a patent 
that has long-term value.  Thus, in a case where the “efficient” outcome would be for the patent to 
be acquired by a major firm in the industry, the possibility that the patent might be transferred to 
a “troll” – with extensive litigation resources – helps to ensure that the market for acquisition of 
the patent (or the firm that holds it) pays “fair” value for the patent.   
245
 In the Court’s words, “the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that 
encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, 
in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”  Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 
525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
246 See Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1038-40.
247
 Patent Act § 112.
248
 Burk & Lemley (2003); FTC REPORT:49.  As Dennis Karjala has pointed out to me, 
the concerns about those cases limiting disclosure can be overstated.  The decisions do not, to be 
sure, require disclosure of the source code.  But if the patent is on the functionality of the 
software, and if the source code is thought to be easily replaceable (as I argue it is), those 
decisions might not be an important obstacle to disclosure.
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information disclosed in a patent application filed years earlier will be of immediate 
value to competitors in the industry.249
Turning from those venerable frameworks, the first important modern theoretical 
analysis of the benefits of patents is the “prospect” theory articulated by Kitch, which 
argues generally that a prospect would be developed most efficiently if one person 
controls it.250 Suzanne Scotchmer in particular has extended the sophistication of Kitch’s 
analysis with respect to industries of cumulative innovation.  Her work (among others) 
has contributed to the development of what Mazzoleni & Nelson generalize as an 
“orderly development” theory of patents.251  In a series of papers (by herself and with 
various co-authors), Scotchmer’s work recognizes that inventors in such an industry must 
have some control over later innovation or they will have an inadequate incentive to 
innovate themselves.252
The key problem is how to provide that control without unduly limiting access to 
later innovators.  Kitch’s analysis rests on the implicit premise that this problem is 
particularly important in areas characterized by broad or pioneer patents.  Later scholars 
that have developed the theory more broadly agree with that point – because its principle 
focus is balancing the benefits of the reward theory against undue harm to later 
innovators.253  Thus, there is some reason to doubt that the theory is directly applicable to 
the software industry, where the kinds of broad pioneer patents that those authors discuss 
249 But see Cohen et al. (2000):29; see also Gruner (2000):1007-13 (arguing that software 
patents increase rate of disclosure of innovation and lower costs of patent races).
250
 Kitch (1977).  For a thoughtful updating of Kitch’s prospect theory, see Kieff (2001); 
see also Gruner (2000):1023-28 (discussing the benefits of centralized control of exploitation of 
an invention).
251
 The term is from Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1042-44.
252
 Scotchmer (1991):31; Green & Scotchmer (1995); Samuelson & Scotchmer (2002).  
The first two of those papers argue that patents should last longer when innovation is spread 
across many firms (as it commonly is in the software industry).  Of course, the rapid pace of 
obsolescence in the software industry suggests that the patent term already exceeds almost all of 
the period in which most patentable inventions will have a useful life.  See Burk & Lemley 
(2003):106 n.182 (discussing proposals to shorten patent term for software).
A recent paper by Bronwyn Hall builds on that literature to argue that the standard of 
nonobviousness should make it harder to obtain patents in industries characterized by rapid and 
cumulative innovation.  Hall (2003).  That is consistent with the suggestions in Cohen & Lemley 
(2001) (discussed supra note 12 and accompanying text).
253 See Mazzoleni & Nelson (1998):1042-44
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are harder to find.254  In any event, all agree that the key question is whether the industry 
can respond to such patents by developing low-transaction-cost patterns of licensing.255
2. The Myth of the Patent Thicket 
If the theories suggest that the key factual question is the ability of industry 
players to obtain access to technology, they do nothing to allay the concerns of the critics 
of the software patent.  Indeed, the putative limitations on access to technology are the
ground on which the most prominent criticisms of software patents have rested.  Larry 
Lessig presents it forcefully as a matter of truth that the proliferation of software patents 
has created a patent “thicket” (Shapiro’s term)256 or an “anticommons” (a term Lessig 
draws from Michael Heller’s work with Becky Eisenberg257). This concern also pervades 
James Bessen’s work (by himself and with other co-authors).258 Specifically, the idea is 
that there are so many overlapping patents in the industry that potential innovators cannot 
readily obtain the approvals necessary to conduct their research.259  The analogy is to a 
Moscow apartment that sits vacant because of the inability of any particular user to obtain 
consents from all of the various parties with interests in the apartment.260
254 See Burk & Lemley (2003):153-156 (suggesting pioneer-patent problem is not 
important in software industry because its “inventions are characterized by more incremental 
improvements”).
255 See, e.g., Cohen et al. (2000):25-29; Lemley (1997):1061-67; Merges & Nelson 
(1990):908; Scotchmer (1991):33-34.  For an important recent contribution from a more general 
perspective, see Wagner (2003) (arguing that increases in appropriability generally are likely to 
increase the amount of information in the public domain, not decrease it).
256
 I use the term from the extended discussion in Shapiro (2001).  That discussion is 
considerably more guarded.  He simply notes the possibility, a perspective with which I agree 
entirely.
257
 Heller & Eisenberg (1998).  Formal economic modeling of this problem appears in 
Buchanan & Yoon (2000); see also Parisi et al. (2000):17-18 (application of that model to 
intellectual property).
258 See Bessen (2003); Bessen & Hunt (2003); Bessen & Maskin (2002).  None of 
Bessen’s relevant work is yet published.  I respond to it in detail here because it is the principal 
empirical authority that Lessig adduces to support his arguments.  Kingston and Kash ultimately 
rest their criticisms on a similar concern, that large firms will “intimidate” outsiders and prevent 
them from competing.  Kingston & Kash (2001):16-17.  For a thorough criticism of the Bessen & 
Hunt paper, see Hahn & Wallsten (2003).
259
 Heller & Eisenberg (1998) previously argued that a similar condition afflicts the 
biotech industry.  A contrary view is articulated forcefully by Walsh et al. (2002).  For rebuttal, 
see Rai & Eisenberg (2003).
260
 Heller (1997).
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The idea of a “thicket” or “anticommons” in the software industry is difficult to 
credit.261  When raised in my interviews, that thesis universally was rejected.262 The 
basic premise of the model is that assets will go unused because of the costs of obtaining 
the permissions necessary to use them.263 As discussed above, there is nothing 
theoretically impossible about that outcome.  The important question, however, is 
whether this is in fact what has happened in the software industry.
In this case, a few objective indicators suggest reasons why the thesis of the 
patent thicket has so little power to say anything usefully descriptive about the industry.  
For one thing, none of the startup firms to which I spoke suggested a practice of doing 
prior-art searches before beginning development of their products.264 As far as I can tell, 
the only occasion in the software industry in which a startup is likely to experience such 
costs is when the startup is founded on a specific piece of existing technology spun off 
from an existing company or from a university laboratory.
For another thing, no investor suggested any concern about the possibility that 
their portfolio firms might be infringing the IP of others in the industry.  That is not 
because they were sure that the startups were not infringing; it was because they thought 
it would be unlikely to pose a significant difficulty if they were.  As discussed above, 
industry executives do accept one premise of the patent-thicket thesis: that software 
patents are multiplying so rapidly that it is likely that many products startups are 
developing ultimately will infringe patents held by large existing companies.  The 
textbook example is IBM, which apparently holds far more software patents than any 
other company in the industry.  Indeed, as I explained above several of my interview 
subjects joked that they thought it likely – without any investigation or particular 
knowledge – that there would be something in IBM’s portfolio that their product 
infringed.
But that posed no significant concern for them.  It is perhaps an artifact of the 
particular history of the industry, but IBM has firmly set a course of relatively lenient 
261
 My reactions are primarily based on my understanding of the history and practice of 
the software industry.  As a more general matter, consistent with my understanding of that 
industry, Rob Merges has long championed the idea that contracting practices often will ensure 
the effective dissemination of IP throughout an industry.  E.g., Merges (1996); Merges 
(2001):140-46.  His current project extends that line of reasoning to private investments in the 
public domain.  He contends that those investments have the potential to limit potential costs 
from “overpropertization,” particularly in the software industry.  Merges (2004).
262 See, e.g., Abbott Interview:6; Beauchamp Interview:6; Eggleston Interview:6; 
Subhedar Interview:3; Treybig Interview:8; Weghorst Interview:6.
263 See, e.g., Buchanan & Yoon (2000):4.
264
 Harlan Interview; Hill Interview: Thomas Interview:1; Urdahl Interview; Witek 
Interview.  Mark Lemley points out that startup firms have a strong incentive not to do such 
searches, both because the results must be included in later patent applications and because they 
can affect the determination of willfulness in later litigation.  Lemley & Tangri (2003); FTC 
REPORT:49-50.
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enforcement of its IP rights.  The lenience of its practices is generally attributed to an 
attitude developed during its long subjection to government antitrust scrutiny, an attitude 
of wishing to refrain from conduct that would be likely to bring the eye of federal 
antitrust regulators back to its practices.265 It is now a circumstance long forgotten by 
many (as IBM is regarded most prominently as a dominant hardware manufacturer), but 
there was a time when IBM’s dominance in the software market was as complete as any 
dominance it ever has had in the hardware market.  Indeed, the most authoritative history 
marks the beginning of the commercial software industry as the date when IBM began to 
sell its proprietary software unbundled from its hardware products.266  To the extent the 
anti-trust litigation tempered IBM’s willingness to press its advantages to their fullest, it 
has limited the rise of a patent thicket in the industry.
IBM’s relative lenience also is attributed to the asymmetric risks IBM faces from 
patent litigation.  As the ongoing SCO litigation demonstrates, a finding that IBM’s 
widely distributed products infringe a valid patent is likely to cost IBM much more 
money than a finding of infringement by a small party with a limited customer base that 
might be involved in litigation with IBM.267
That is not to say that IBM allows people to use its IP freely.268  It is to say, 
however, that licenses to use its IP are freely available to all legitimate users.269  Indeed, 
it appears that the principal, if not the only, reason that IBM would be unwilling to grant 
a license to use its patents would be if the party requesting the license refused to grant 
IBM parallel access to the parties’ own IP.270  Thus, IBM has followed a consistent two-
pronged strategy: attempting to gain as free access as it can to all IP in the industry 
265 See Crouse Interview:3 (discussing history of IBM’s patent licensing practices); 
Dinkin Interview:5-6.
266 CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):109-10.
267 See Dinkin Interview:8.
268
 For discussion of the profitability of the licensing to IBM, see GERSTNER (2002):146-
52.
269
 IBM’s Web site reports that it “is generally willing to grant nonexclusive licenses 
under reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to those who in turn, respect IBM's 
intellectual property (IP) rights.”  See IBM Worldwide Patent Licensing Practices, available at
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/practices.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003); ARORA ET 
AL. (2001):235-36 (discussing requirements imposed on IBM by consent decrees in antitrust 
litigation with the United States); CHANDLER (2001):250 (same).
270
 IBM’s Web site reports only that it “includes in the terms and conditions of a license 
an option for a comparable license-back of the licensee’s patents under similar terms and 
conditions,” and that “[i]n cases where a licensing partner has a significant patent portfolio, IBM 
will consider a patent cross license.”  See IBM Worldwide Patent Licensing Practices, available 
at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/practices.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
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(giving IBM the freedom to market and sell as freely as possible),271 and at the same time 
generating a steady stream of revenues from its now massive software-patent portfolio.272
As Rosemarie Ziedonis has shown, this strategy of heavy patenting is not at all 
uncommon for large firms like IBM in an environment characterized by fractionation of 
technology.273
That focus on freedom of action is a rational strategy for a large firm like IBM.  
Given its advantages in prestige, resources, marketing, and other forms of infrastructure, 
it is reasonable for IBM to conclude that it can succeed in the marketplace without using 
the relatively ineffective tool of IP to appropriate the value of its inventions.  Thus, the 
principal relevance of IP to IBM is to ensure that it is in fact free to commercialize 
whatever products it desires.  If the patent portfolio that it uses to ensure that freedom 
also happens to generate substantial revenues, that is a nice thing, but not nearly so 
central to the firm’s core strategy.
Nor is this strategy unique to IBM.  Microsoft, for example, has an impressively 
large portfolio, but does not appear to enforce it aggressively.274  Its recent adoption of an 
open licensing policy that resembles IBM’s policy275 suggests at least an implicit 
acknowledgment that IBM has discerned the correct strategy.  There of course is the 
possibility that Microsoft’s current strategy is motivated as much by its experience with 
antitrust litigation as IBM’s.  Finally, other large firms that I interviewed in related 
industries suggested that their IP strategies were quite similar.276
The noted277 paper by James Bessen and Eric Maskin articulates a contrary view, 
reasoning that sequential innovation in an industry with complementarity of inventions is 
likely to lead to an anticommons.278 As a theoretical matter, the paper is fatally flawed 
271 See Treybig Interview:5 (“IBM[’s strategy] is to keep anybody with a patent from 
hindering what they want to do. * * * * The role of patents was to protect the company against 
innovation so the company could not be stopped from doing anything it wanted.”).
272
 IBM’s Web site reports a standard fee of 1% of the “selling price” for use of a single 
patent in a product, with a maximum fee of 5%.  See IBM Worldwide Patent Licensing Practices, 
available at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/practices.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
273
 Ziedonis 2004.
274
 I am not aware of any patent infringement litigation instituted by Microsoft.  I am in 
the early stages of collection of data for an empirical project examining patent litigation by and 
against large software firms, which should shed more light on that question.
275 http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/dec03/12-03ExpandIPPR.asp (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2003).
276
 I had two such interviews with representatives of Fortune 500 technology firms.  
Unfortunately, both requested anonymity with respect to that discussion.
277
 The paper is the principal empirical support that Lessig offers for his discussion of the 
subject.  
278
 Bessen & Maskin (2002).
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by its failure even to notice the literature discussed above, which indicates that the 
effectiveness of licensing will depend to a great degree on context.279 To the extent that 
literature supports conclusions that are independent of historical context, Merges & 
Nelson argue that a positive outcome is particularly likely – as in the software industry –
in cases in which there is not a single pioneering patent or group of patents that gives one 
firm control.280  The numerous sectors into which the software industry is divided have 
made it difficult for any single patent or group of patents to control a major part of the 
whole industry.281
The paper’s empirical premises are similarly weak.  Bessen and Maskin rest their 
model on the explicit assumption that firms will not be able to reach value-increasing 
licensing agreements to make technology widely available in the industry.282 That is not 
only an assumption that sets them outside the general pattern of theoretical analysis; it 
also is one that makes their model implausible as an empirical matter.  To be sure, they 
do present empirical evidence to support their model, but the evidence terminates with 
1995 – a very early stage of the software industry – and they examine only firms that they 
identify as leading software patentees, rather than leading firms in the industry.  Thus, 
their dataset includes companies like Ford, but excludes companies like Microsoft and 
Oracle. Thus, the dataset appears to include a large number of patents that may have 
little relevance to the competitive situation in the software industry and at the same time 
exclude many of the patents that have the plainest competitive significance.  A plausible 
analysis of that question at a minimum must examine the effect of patents in major 
software firms.283
James Bessen’s recent paper articulates a more complex model of the same
problem.  He recognizes the possibility that optimal incentives for research and 
development can occur when firms develop a culture of “mutual non-aggression.”284  He 
argues, however, that “aggressive” cross-licensing is a distinct pattern that is likely to 
lead to sub-optimal incentives for innovation in industries in which patent standards are 
279 See Merges & Nelson (1990):894-897; Merges & Nelson (1994):13-16.
280 See Merges & Nelson (1990):908-11; Merges & Nelson (1994):4-5.
281
 That is not to say that there have not been important patents that have allowed a single 
firm for a time to dominate a particular sector.  The Rambus patent is the most common example 
mentioned in my interviews.  Urdahl.  But dominance of a single sector for a time is far from 
dominance of the entire industry.  Moreover, that kind of patent-based dominance has never
occurred in favor of a dominating incumbent like IBM or Microsoft.  Thus, those patents are 
much less troublesome than, for example, the Edison light bulb patent that Merges & Nelson 
discuss.  Merges & Nelson (1990); Merges & Nelson (1994).
282
 Bessen & Maskin (2002):5.
283
 I am working with John Allison on a project that will address that particular point 
more specifically by integrating financial data and patents obtained by firms in the Software 500.
284
 Bessen (2003).
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too low, particularly in cases in which mature incumbents populate the industry.285
Whatever the merits of that analysis, there is little reason to think that it is applicable to 
the software industry.  As discussed above, it is clear that the licensing culture in the 
industry depends to a considerable degree on the practices of the industry’s leader.  And 
it is clear that IBM has determined for reasons of its own – influenced to be sure by 
federal antitrust enforcement286 – that it should refrain from pressing its patent portfolio 
aggressively.  Thus, although it is always possible to imagine that aggressive practices 
could lead to sub-optimal innovations,287 the historical events that have made IBM and 
now Microsoft as cautious as they are make it difficult to argue that those patterns have 
emerged,288 and unlikely that those patterns will emerge in the foreseeable future.289
What all of this means for purposes of potential patent thickets is that potential 
innovators know that the large mass of existing patents held by IBM and Microsoft are 
likely to receive some share of revenues from any major new product.  There is, of 
course, nothing wrong with that.  IBM does spend billions of dollars each year on 
research and development related to the software technology on which it receives patents.
It is not alone in that practice.290  The fact that it can earn royalties from those patents 
285
 Bessen (2003):14-15.
286 See supra note 269.
287
 The possibility that a disadvantageous structure could have developed doubtless 
explains much of the fears of software patents expressed in the early days of the industry.  See
LESSIG (2001) (discussing such fears); Fox & Kelley (2002) (in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS):193-94 
(discussing those fears, and how they have dissipated with actual experience in the industry).  A 
number of public statements on that point were delivered in a 1994 Department of Commerce 
hearing in San Jose, at which several firms (including Adobe, Borland, and Oracle) argued 
against software patents, while several others argued in their favor (including IBM, Intel, and 
Microsoft).  The statements are available at http://lpf.ai.mit.edu/Patents/testimony/statements/. 
288
 For a typical news story, see Patents: A Necessary Evil (2002), available at
http://news.com.com/2009-1001-801896.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (discussing IBM licenses 
that permitted development of technologies for DVD, PalmPilot, Handspring, and TIVO).
289
 The related paper (Bessen & Hunt (2003)) argues that patents have caused sub-optimal 
investment in the software industry.  As with Bessen & Maskin (2002), the data set is so loosely 
connected to the industry as a whole as to make their conclusions inherently suspect.  For present 
purposes, however, a few points are noteworthy.  For one thing, they do not collect patents for the 
software industry.  Rather, they collect patents that based on key words are reasonably likely to 
be patents that involve software.  Many of those patents, as they recognize, are not by firms in the 
software industry at all.  Also, their dataset involves only firms that are on CompuStat, which 
excludes the majority of firms in the software industry.  In particular, to the extent that a 
significant part of investment in the industry is not included in CompuStat – it includes none of 
the venture-capital investment that this paper examines – their dataset cannot be taken to support 
any conclusion about the industry as a whole.
290 See also Crouse Interview (suggesting that the ability to generate patent royalties from 
Microsoft’s research department helped justify that section’s budget allocations).  It is difficult to 
get details about revenues from software patents, but overall patent licensing revenues have risen 
from less than $20 billion in 1990 to well over $100 billion by 2000.  RIVETTE & KLINE:6.  At 
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through freely licensing them to all comers does not suggest a patent thicket.  On the 
contrary, a patent thicket would exist only if industry licensing practices were such that 
firms in the industry commonly were unable to agree on terms for licenses and thus 
retreated from the field of innovation.  That is not a plausible portrait of the commercial 
software industry as it now exists.
Another more plausible possibility is that the “tax” on innovation created by 
cross-licensing fees is detrimental to innovation in the industry.  From this perspective, it 
is not that the existing patents are so widely distributed as to make it impossible for firms 
to obtain access to the technology, it is just that the cost of paying for access to that 
technology lowers the return on investment in the industry to the point that investments in 
innovation are less than they would be without patents.  Part of the difficulty in assessing 
that possibility is the intractability of determining whether a typical 5% license fee is a 
sufficient drag on a small firm’s profitability to amount to a substantial burden.  The 
problem would be more severe if firms often had to pay multiple licensing fees, but that 
seems most unlikely based on the interviews that I have conducted.  In the end, my 
instinct is that it is not a substantial burden.  I am driven particularly by the point that the 
licensing fees normally are paid only on revenues – not simply on use of the patented 
technology – and thus impose no costs on firms that are in a pre-revenue development 
stage.
3.  The Effects of Software Patents
The preceding sections are only a partial analysis of the effects of software 
patents.  At best, they establish that the ready availability of technology through cross 
licensing minimizes the adverse effects of patents in the software industry.  Thus, 
although individual firms surely find it valuable that they can use patents as barter in 
cross-licensing transactions, that arrangement does nothing to show that patents as a 
whole are beneficial in the software industry.  After all, you might think it would be 
cheaper for everybody if we did not have patents if everybody in the industry is going to 
allow everybody else free access to technology.291
If the role of patents in cross licensing is to be positive, they will have to provide 
some benefit that exceeds the transaction costs of obtaining the patents.  For example, it 
IBM alone, IP licensing revenues were more than $500 million in 2002.  IBM does not report 
separately the figures for software-patent licensing, but it has reported that about a third of the 
patents it has received in the last decade (7,500 out of 2,500) and the last year (12,50 out of 
3,300) are software patents (IBM Tops U.S. Patent List (Jan. 13, 2003), available at http://www-
3.ibm.com/software/swnews/swnews.nsf/n/mmaa5hrqgp?OpenDocument&Site=default (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2003), so it is reasonable to estimate that its software-related patent licensing 
revenues are in the range of $150-$200 million a year.
291
 Remember, cross licensing in the software industry as it currently exists is not a 
system for disseminating technology, it is simply a device for avoiding patent liability.  Firms that 
cross-license do not generally help each other understand the licensed technology; they simply 
give free rein to develop products despite potential claims of patent infringement.
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might be that it is easier to share technology cooperatively in a world with patents than in 
a world without it.  Most obviously, patents provide a way to discipline firms that are not 
cooperative; without patents, it would be difficult to discipline firms that seek to use their 
technological developments offensively.  With patents, firms that wish to use their 
technology offensively must accept the likelihood of suit by other industry players for 
infringement of the patents held by those players.  In an industry where innovation is so 
cumulative that all products include innovations first discovered by numerous players, 
and where it is difficult to produce a major product except in a company of substantial 
size, that could be an important consideration.
As a second possibility, patents might provide an effective way of evaluating the 
value of the technology that each firm has so as to determine the amount and direction of 
payment that is appropriate for each contracting pair.  This might be particularly 
important in an industry, like the software industry, in which there are a large number of 
players with widely varying patent portfolios.  By contrast, in an industry with a small 
number of relatively equal participants, a straight patent pool (without pair-by-pair 
determinations of value) would make more sense.  
Of course, cross licensing is not the only patent benefit discussed above.292  The 
analysis of signaling, codification of tacit knowledge, and aiding acquisitions suggests 
benefits that directly facilitate the flow of funds into the software firm and thus provide 
direct support for innovation in the industry.293  Similarly, the ability to shelter small 
firms at an early stage in their competitive growth could have a significant effect on the 
structure of the industry.  If the literature on innovation suggests that cumulative 
innovation proceeds better when more investigators attempt to resolve a particular 
problem, then an institution that supports the proliferation of firms should foster an 
industrial structure more conducive to innovation.294  If – as I argue – the principal direct 
benefits of patents protect small firms and help them obtain financing, then software 
patents may play a role in the high levels of fractionation we observe in the industry as it 
currently exists.295  It surely is true that patents are not as effective in appropriating the 
292 See supra Sections VI(B)(2)(b)-(d).
293
 It is not clear, however, that those same benefits could not be produced with a system 
that did not burden later innovators by excluding them from the covered technology.
294
 Merges (1996a) presents a thoughtful discussion about the role of IP in the structure of 
the software industry.  He takes the view that IP protection should be set to accommodate the 
view “that having more, smaller firms is better than fewer, larger firms.”  P. 287.  For similar 
sentiments, see Langlois & Steinmuller, in MOWERY & NELSON (1999):50, 55 (discussing the 
semiconductor industry).
295
 Writing in 1996, Merges discusses the possibility that stronger IP might foster 
innovation by facilitating entry of venture-backed firms that might develop “multiple, rivalrous 
technologies.”  Merges (1996a):287-90.  He was not persuaded at that time that stronger IP would 
have that effect.  In my view, the development of the industry in the intervening years supports 
the more optimistic of his predictions.  More recently, he argues with Arora that stronger IP rights 
can facilitate joint production in industries in which suppliers and buyers are not vertically 
integrated.  Arora & Merges (2001).  That argument is consistent with the analysis here, which 
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value of software inventions as they are in appropriating the value of some other kinds of 
inventions.  Thus, the protection that patents afford may be relatively thin.  That surely is 
the implication of the empirical evidence discussed in the companion paper.  Still, even a 
thin protection that has positive effects is a good thing.296
It is of course quite difficult to prove that the industry is better off with patents, 
because it is difficult to construct a factual experiment that involves the modern software 
industry without patents. The closest thing we to such an experiment is Petra Moser’s 
recent work related to 19th century patent fairs.297  That work demonstrates, at least in the 
context that she examines, that the absence of patent protection has a substantial effect on 
the allocation of resources.  She shows that innovative resources in economies without 
patent protection flow to industries where other methods of appropriating the value of 
inventions make patent protection of relatively limited importance.  At the same time, 
innovative resources flow away from industries where patents are an important method of 
appropriating value.  If I am right in arguing above that patents provide significant 
assistance to small companies trying to appropriate the value of their software inventions, 
then, her work suggests, the removal of patent protection might lead to a flow of 
innovative resources away from the industry.
The shifting nature of IP protection in the industry makes it difficult to be sure of 
the effect patent protection currently has.  It is true, for example, that the industry thrived 
in the early days of the 1970’s and 1980’s without broad patent protection.  As suggested 
in Part II, however, copyright protection was broader then that it has become during the 
last decade.  More fundamentally, the structure of the industry and its products was very 
different then.  As the industry has matured, innovation has become more complicated 
and technical than anybody could have imagined in the 1960’s.  Thus, there has been a 
considerable increase both in the amount of investment required and in the benefits of 
having multiple firms working on cutting-edge problems.  If patents are helping to direct 
venture-capital resources into firms in investment-intensive sectors of the industry, then it 
is plausible to think that there is more innovation in those sectors than there would be 
without patents.
Bessen’s arguments that R&D spending has fallen during the years since software 
patents became available could weigh against my thesis, but the evidence does not 
provide much factual support for his argument.  For one thing, his focus on large 
patentholders in a particular class – rather than the software industry – makes his dataset 
almost useless for this purpose.  Most obviously, most of the largest patentholders in the 
particular sectors that he examines are large manufacturing firms (Ford, General Electric, 
and Japanese firms like Mitsubishi and Matsushita), for whom software patents are at 
best a minor part of the firm’s operations.  Yet the paper does not even attempt to 
suggests that the IP rights can enhance the ability of numerous smaller firms attempting to 
develop technology that would be useful in products sold by a small number of large firms.
296
 For a similar line of reasoning, see Burk & Lemley (2003).
297
 Moser (2003).
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determine the amount of R&D spending those firms actually allocate to software 
development.  The idea that changes in American software patenting rules are altering the 
overall R&D spending of those firms seems so dubious as to render the statistical analysis 
of the data of no value.
Moreover, a glance at data that does address the software industry suggests quite a 
different picture.  Technology Review's Corporate R&D Scorecards report the annual 
research and development spending of the world’s top 150 technology companies.  Each 
company is assigned to one of 12 sectors based on its primary business.  The scorecard 
figures are derived from annual reports and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
filings.  Data from the Scorecards indicates that R&D spending for the software industry 
is higher than in similar high-tech industries.  For example, R&D spending as a 
percentage of revenues in the software industry for 2002 was 14.5.298 By comparison for 
the same period, it has been 6.7% for computer hardware, 7.4% for electrical/electronics, 
and 8.1% for telecommunications.  Thus, for the top technology companies, the R&D 
intensity ratios are quite high in the software industry in comparison to other 
industries.299  Given the limited manufacturing materials that go into software, those high 
figures should not be surprising.  But it is hard to credit Bessen’s argument that R&D 
spending in the industry is systemically depressed.
National Science Foundation data regarding industrial R&D intensity provides a 
similar picture.  That data shows that R&D intensity for firms in the software industry 
(NAICS code 5112) was 19.3%, 20.0%, 16.8% and 20.5%, for the years 1997-2000, 
respectively, far above the average in all industrial R&D firms of about 3.6%.300 Indeed, 
according to the National Science Foundation, the software industry for the past four 
years has had an R&D intensity substantially higher than any industry other than 
Scientific R&D Services (NAICS code 5417).
As this data shows, software R&D spending tends to be relatively stable from 
year to year as a percentage of sales.  Indeed, the most obviously significant variable in 
R&D spending within the industry appears to be company size.  Relying on data from 
CompuStat, median R&D spending for large public companies (over $100 million in 
sales) in SIC 7372 (prepackaged software) is only 15.9% of net sales, while mid-sized 
firms (between $30 million and $100 million) spent 22.6%, and small firms (under $30 
million) spent 32.8%.  Those figures have not changed substantially over the last three 
298 It was 14% in 2001 and 14.5% in 2000.  This figure seems to have been quite stable 
over time.  Prominent industry estimates in the early 1980’s suggested that the costs of “program 
development” were at that time about 15% of revenues.  CAMPBELL-KELLY (2003):211.
299 Examples from other countries do not seem to be useful.  For example, the software 
industry in Europe – where patent protection is considerably more ambiguous than it is here – is 
strikingly underdeveloped compared to the United States.  But it is plain that the relative levels of 
development have historical reasons that have little to do with patent protection.  See CAMPBELL-
KELLY (2003); Mowery (in MOWERY & NELSON (1999)).
300 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION/DIVISION OF SCIENCE RESOURCE STATISTICS, 
SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: 2000.
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years.301  The Software 500 provides similar statistics for the 500 largest firms in the 
industry (including both public and private firms).  For 2001, firms with more than $100 
million in sales had an average R&D intensity ratio of 12.83%302; firms with sales 
between $30 and $100 million had an R&D intensity of 20.49%; and firms with less than 
$30 million in sales had an R&D intensity of 23.89%.303
For now, perhaps the most that can be said with clarity is the basic point that 
began this section: the patent system is not systematically preventing the initiation of 
product development.  Beyond that, it is plain that the system is not obviously 
dysfunctional.  In the world that we have – with patents – there are literally hundreds of 
small firms using institutional financing to develop new technologies.  It is as difficult to 
be sure that all of those firms would exist if there were no patent protection as it is to be 
sure that there would not be even more firms if there were no patent protection.
4. A Note on Open Source
In my mind, the biggest question about the effectiveness of software patents 
relates to the interrelation between commercial software development (the topic of this 
paper) and the open-source movement.  This paper relates almost entirely to the 
commercial software industry, where software is developed and commercialized in an 
institutional way.  My evidence suggests that within that framework patents are useful, 
largely because they offer more benefits than costs to small firms.  However, coexisting 
with the commercial software industry is a large and apparently growing open-source 
community, which develops software largely without commercial investment or 
affirmative IP protections.304  Those who work in that community may have little or no 
need for patents.  The cooperative nature of development obviates any need for the actual 
and implicit cross licensing that disseminates access to technology throughout the 
commercial software sector.  Similarly, because open source developers do not depend on 
301 2001: 16.5%, 26.9, 41.7; 2000: 15.9%, 28.0, 52.4; 1999: 15.1%, 20.0, 41.4.  I note that 
the R&D intensity is much higher in SIC 7372 than in the rest of the 7370s (at least for larger 
firms).  The average R&D intensity of the other firms in the 7370 series (in 2002) was 7.10% for 
large firms, 13.5% for medium firms and 34% for small firms.  The average R&D intensity in the 
7370 series as a whole was 9.2% for large firms, 17.7% for medium firms, and 38.5% for small 
firms.
302
 Interestingly enough, IBM’s R&D intensity is far below the industry average (6% in 
2001, 5.8% in 2000, and 6% in 1999), although it amounts to over 5 billion dollars each year, 
while Microsoft’s is considerably above the average: 17% in 2001, 16.3% in 2000, 15% in 1999 
(about $3.8 billion each year).
303
  A similar trend is evidenced in the preceding three years.  I expect to analyze the 
relation between patenting and R&D intensity in the Software 500 in the companion paper with 
John Allison.
304
 The literature on that subject is large and contentious.  For a lucid, accessible, and 
reasonably balanced introduction, see FINK (2002).
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outside equity investment to any significant degree, the limited ability to appropriate a 
software invention poses little harm to them.
The problem, however, is that the open-source community does not exist in a 
vacuum.  It exists in a world in which the commercial software industry is building up 
large portfolios of protected IP, portfolios that pose a serious threat to the open-source 
community.  To put the matter in a current context, suppose for a moment that the Linux 
operating system in fact does infringe in a substantial way patents held by SCO.  That 
could305 result in liability for all of the many firms using the Linux operating system.  
The problem is that the open-source community has set itself outside of the cooperative 
IP framework of the mainstream software industry.  Thus, its members have no patents of 
their own with which they might protect themselves in such litigation.  At the same time, 
it has developed its software with the same cavalier attitude to the possibility of patent 
infringement as commercial software firms exemplify.  Those two habits cannot coexist 
in the long run.
That raises the question, in turn, whether the potential for high-quality software 
development by the open-source movement justifies eradication of software patents even 
for the commercial software industry.  It is impossible to answer that question 
definitively without evidence that would allow a comparative weighing of the benefits of 
open-source software against the benefits that the commercial software industry derives 
from IP.  In any event, that question is far beyond the scope of this paper.  I note it here 
only to define the bounds of my analysis.  The primary goal of this paper is to shed light 
on the role of IP in the commercial software industry.  I believe I have offered some good 
reasons to think that role might be positive.  Whether that role justifies any harm IP might 
pose to open-source developers is a question left for another day.
VII.  Conclusion
We know little about the process of innovation generally and about how 
innovation works in the software industry.  This paper attempts to grapple with those 
questions by identifying a point of significance in understanding the role of IP in 
industries of cumulative innovation – such as the software industry in this country.  In 
those industries, IP can play a crucial role in innovation.  It is not, however, the old-
economy Chandlerian306 way of inducing massive investment in R&D by incumbent 
firms.  On the contrary, it serves as a device to foster high degrees of fractionation.  By 
increasing the number of approaches to resolving important problems, fractionation can 
provide for an ever more rapid pace of innovation and consequent Schumpeterian 
305
 This assumes, of course, that SCO has not in some manner (through use of the General 
Public License or otherwise) lost its right to enforce those patents in this context.
306 See Chandler (2001) (arguing that the key to success in cutting-edge industries is 
developing comprehensive competence in a single firm).
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destruction.307  From that perspective, IP can be an engine of competitive discipline, and 
not a tool to block competition.
307
 Mowery & Nelson (in MOWERY & NELSON (1999)):369-70 (explaining that 
continuous entry of new firms into the software industry limits the value of “dominant design” 
theories and “first mover” advantage in explaining the structure of the software industry).  See 
also LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS (1999) (case studies discussing failure of once-dominant software 
firms).
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